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1CHAPTER 1: A SYNTHESIS OF POSTMODERN AND EXISTENTIAL ETHICS
Cityof Glass, the first of three postmodern detective novellas in Paul Auster's The New York
Trilogy, is a story about a man making choices. Quinn, the novella's protagonist, chooses to
play the role of a detective. He chooses to accept a case, and in a train station,he chooses to
follow one man instead of another. The story begins due to faulty telephone wiring. A
woman tries to call a private investigator but gets Quinn's apartment instead. After several
similar calls Quinn decides to play along and accepts the case offered by the woman's
husband. Doing so leads Quinn to more choices, and he is quickly overwhelmed by the
mounting decisions he must make. At one point he is asked to follow his client's father.
Before he can begin this task, Quinn identifies two men in a train station that equally meet
the description provided by his client. The situation nearly paralyzes Quinn with indecision:
"There was nothing he could do now that would not be a mistake. Whatever choice he
made—and he had to make a choice—would be arbitrary, a submission to chance.
Uncertainty would haunt him to the end" (68). Quinn's decision is bound to uncertainty. He
cannot consciously make the right choice because neither is undeniably correct. By choosing
one, he will not choose the other. This forces Quinn to live with the possibility that the other
man is the one he was asked to follow.
I will argue that Auster's characters in Moon Palace and Leviathan are often faced
with a similar dilemma. They recognize the world as fragmented. When they act well, they
also recognize that there is nothing they can do about this fragmentation, no way of uniting
the various aspects of existence, no system of knowing that will confidently allow them to
choose one fragment over another. When his characters act poorly, they deny what they
know; they deny fragmentation and pointlessly strive for unity.
A postmodern worldview permeates Auster's work, and finding ways to act within
this worldview is a major concern of his, one he frequently finds existential answers to. That
said, I need to take a step back and define my terms. Postmodernism and existentialism are
two concepts that are widely and differently defined. My first chapter seeks to arrive at a
usable definition and synthesis of these terms in an effort to reveal Auster's answers this
question: recognizing a postmodern world, how does one act? I will begin my study with a
discussion of the relevance of ethical criticism. Then I will turn my attention to an
examination of the pertinent elements of postmodern and existential ethics for the study of
Auster's fiction.
Ethical Criticism and Literary Analysis
Auster's concern for the ways in which individuals act is a relevant one. In The Company
We Keep: An Ethics ofFiction, Wayne C. Booth defines the role of ethical criticism in a
contemporary world. For Booth, narration is bound to advice; one cannot tell a story without
providing some type of instruction. While this instruction may be moral, it is not necessarily
so; in fact, the types of instruction and advice presented in narratives vary greatly. Booth
demonstrates the wide range of possibilities: "Narratives, fictional and reportorial, can offer
to teach me how to get rich quick, how to behave socially as if I were rich, what wines to
serve on what occasions, [and] which modes of stroking or stabbing rivals are most effective
in various situations" (210). His point, obviously enough, is that advice is present within
narration. Booth goes on to note that when the advice becomes overly didactic readers have
a tendency to dismiss it as something other than literature. In other words, overtly moral
tales lose their power. Dismissingthe clearlypedagogical, however, does not mean that non-
didactic narratives are without moral and ethical dimensions.
Booth identifies the stories that maintain a presence in the lives of readers as the ones
that offer "a distinctive, engagingway of being together, one of manypossiblewaysof
addressing a world of conflicting values" (216). As I mentioned earlier, even non-didactic
stories offer advice, and because they do so, they are subject to ethical criticism. For Booth,
however, discussing the ethical elements of a work does not depend upon the type of advice
the work propagates. Consequently, "Such talk will never lead to flat judgments like *true'
or 'false' or 'virtuous' or 'wicked,' and it will thus not satisfy those who want an ethical
criticism that will provide fixed conclusions" (217). Booth's criticism will not and cannot
provide a set of concrete rules for ethical judgment; on the other hand it will adamantly deny
the notion that art can only be judged on aesthetic grounds.
While ethical criticism will not provide "fixed conclusions," Booth believes it can
offer a wide range of insight into the narratives it examines. Understanding virtue and ethos
and their role in ethical criticism is important. Booth defines virtue as "every kind of
genuine strength or power," and ethos as "the total range of.. .virtues" (11). According to
this definition ethos is used in its classical sense; it comprises character. And in this sense
the virtues that make up an individual's character are not strictly those that have traditionally
been considered morally good. In light of these meanings, Booth defines ethical criticism as
"any effort to show how the virtues of narratives relate to the virtues of selves and societies,
or how the ethos of any story affects or is affected by the ethos—the collection of virtues—of
any given reader" (11). Ethical criticism addresses the connection between the virtues of a
story and those of a reader. It also provides an avenue into the study of Auster's fiction.
Jean Paul Sartre makes a similar argument in What is Literature? He believes the
roleof the prosewriterto be oneof disclosing. Sartre notes that, "If youname the behaviour
of an individual, you reveal it to him; he sees himself. And since you are at the same time
naming it to all others,he knows that he is seen at themomenthe sees himself (36-7). By
naming something, the author marks and changes his environment. As Sartre states, "To
speak is to act; anything which one names is already no longer quite the same; it has lost its
innocence" (36). Naming, or disclosing, allows a reader to recognize that he is seen, that he
exists in the world; it also alters the reader—it cannot do otherwise. To use Booth's
terminology, the ethos of a narration will necessarily affect the reader, and the influence it
has on a reader is the proper study of literary criticism. Sartre argues that we have a right to
ask of a writer: "What aspect of the world do you want to disclose?" And, "What change do
you what to bring into the world by this disclosure?" (37). Paul Auster wants to disclose the
postmodern nature of existence. And he wants to provide for his readers a way of acting
honestly and well in such a world. This is his way of offering a "distinctive, engagingway of
being together" (Booth 216).
The Ethics of Postmodernism
One of the defining characteristics of a postmodern worldview is the conviction that no view
of the world can be universal, absolute, or permanent, including a postmodern one. David
Harvey's The Condition ofPostmodemity presents an understanding of the postmodern
condition that can help to illuminate Auster's conception of the world. Harvey begins his
study by setting postmodemity and postmodemism up as a reaction to modemity and
modernism. He quotes from the architectural journal PRECIS to quickly define the latter.
"universal modernism has been identified with the belief in linear progress, absolute truths,
the rational planning of ideal social orders, and the standardization of knowledge and
production" (9). At its heart the modem pursuit is a noble one, with what it hopes will be the
singular and absolute truth for all humanity as its goal. Modemism, however, has not been
able to meet its desired result. As seen throughout the twentieth century, the modernist
pursuit if taken to its logical ends is a flawed and at times tragic endeavor.
The nobility of the modem idea, for Harvey, finds its home in the Enlightenment. He
uses J. Habermas to define the Enlightenment's ^'project of modernity" as a massive effort
"to develop objective science, universal morality and law, and autonomous art according to
their inner logic" (qtd. in Harvey 12). The hope driving such "intellectual effort" was the
encouragement of freedom, and the improvement of life. The problem with "linear progress"
leading to "absolute truths" or "universal morality and law" is that everyone is required to
improve according to the structure's definition of progress; and once the truth has been
discovered and laws have been established, everyone is bound to adhere to that singular truth
and its laws. The hoped for freedom is then set aside in order to coerce everyone to follow
what a few have declared to be universal. Harvey paraphrases Horkheimer and Adomo's
The Dialetic ofEnlightenment to note that for the burgeoning postmodern thinkers "the
Enlightenment project was doomed to turn against itself and transform the quest for human
emancipation into a system of universal oppression in the name of human liberation" (13). It
was doomed because "the logic that hides behind Enlightenment rationality is a logic of
domination and oppression. The lust to dominate nature entailed the domination of human
beings" (13). For Harvey, modernity—from its inception—was structurally flawed.
Harvey moves from a critique ofmodernity to its aesthetic presentation, modemism.
To do this, he uses Baudelaire's understanding of the role of the artist For Baudelaire, the
modem age "is the transient, the fleeting, the contingent; it is the one half of art, the other
being the eternal and the immutable" (qtd. in Harvey 10). The artist's role in sucha world is
to be "someone who can concentrate his or her vision on ordinary subjects of city life,
understand their fleeting qualities, and yet extract from the passing moment all the
suggestions of eternity it contains" (20). In other words, while the philosophers and
scientists were trying to use reason and logic to constmct universal norms, the artist
recognized difference as a core component of humanity, but tried in presenting various
scenes to extract from this difference what is universally or absolutely true.
Postmodemity and its aesthetic presentation, postmodernism, on the other hand, give
up the hope that universal or absolute truth can be obtained, regardless of the amount of
knowledge one can acquire. To explain this shift, Harvey appeals to Brian McHale's
Postmodernist Fiction. Using McHale, Harvey argues that the focus of postmodern novels
moves away from epistemology toward ontology. It is "a shift from the kind of
perspectivism that allowed the modemist to get a better bearing on the meaning of a complex
but nevertheless singular reality, to the foregrounding of questions as to how radically
different realities may coexist, collide, and interpenetrate" (41). It is a movement away from
a belief that one reality exists and that understanding reality is dependent on the quantity of
knowledge one can collect of it, to a concern that multiple realities exist and living within
them can be challenging. As a result of this shift, Harvey notes that "postmodemist
characters often seem confused as to which world they are in, and how they should act with
respect to it" (41).
It may be important to note McHale's use of ontology. He uses Thomas Pavel to
define ontology as "a theoretical description of a universe" (qtd. in McHale 27) and then
focuses on Pavel's use of the indefinite article attached to "universe." This detail is
important for McHale's understanding of postmodemism as essentially an ontological
aesthetic, because "an ontology is a description of a universe, not of the universe; that is, it
may describe any universe, potentially a plurality of universes. In other words, to *do'
ontology in this perspective is not necessarily to seek some grounding for our universe; it
might just as appropriately involve describing other universes, including 'possible' or even
impossible' universes" (27). Plurality is important for both McHale's and Harvey's
understanding of postmodemism. Postmodernist fiction then describes, or as Sartre would
say, names and discloses, the characteristics of multiple universes, and modes of being.
A description of a "plurality of universes" often includes the ways in which
individuals create personal universes through language. Harvey discusses this phenomenon
through his use of Jean Lyotard whose work also contrasts modem and postmodern
conceptions of the world. Harvey suggests that Lyotard
takes the modernist preoccupation with language and pushes it to extremes of
dispersal. While 'the social bond is linguistic,' he argues, it *is not woven with a
single thread' but by an indeterminate number of 'language games.' Each of us lives
'at the intersection of many of these' and we do not necessarily establish 'stable
language combinations and the properties of the ones we do establish are not
necessarily communicable.' (46)
Each individual uses language differently depending on the social simation. The language I
use to write this paper differs from the one I might use on the athletic field, which differs
from the one I might use amongclose friends. Each individual has a cache of such language
situations, and a different "languagegame" is appropriate for each one, but evenwithineach
game, the rules are never explicitly developed or followed.
ForHarvey the shift to postmodernism has severalunwelcome consequences. In its
reaction to modernity, postmodemity rejects the concept of progress. Harvey sees the
consequence of such a rejection as an abandonment of "all sense of historical continuity and
memory, while simultaneously developing an incredible ability to plunderhistoryand absorb
whatever it finds there as some aspect of the present" (54). According to Harvey, history for
the postmodern observer has no reality, and cannot be seen as a meta-narrative. As a result,
individuals can pick and choose what elements of history to present based on what seems
appropriate for the present. Harvey's interpretation of the postmodern world is one in which
the historian can only compile facts, and the cultural critic "can judge the spectacle only in
terms of how spectacular it is" (56-7). Harvey concludes that while positive achievements
have come from postmodernism, it is ultimately a negative movement.
The good that postmodernism has achieved, Harvey admits, is a constant awareness
of the other. Harvey suggests, "That in its concern for difference, for the difficulties of
communication, for the complexity and nuances of interests, cultures, places, and the like, it
exercises a positive influence" (113). Unfortunately, this positive influence is limited; in his
reading of the situation, the good of postmodernism is ultimately undone by itself. The
otherness of postmodernism becomes too great. He argues that, "The superimposition of
different worlds in many a postmodern novel, worlds between which an uncommunicative
'otherness' prevails in a space of coexistence, bears an uncanny relationship to the increasing
ghettoization, disempowerment, and isolation of poverty and minority populations in the
inner cities of both Britain and the United States" (113-14). The very element Harvey sees as
the one positive of postmodernism works against it andsociety, contributing to some of the
more ghastly ills of contemporary life. He further suggests that postmodernism's focus on
the ephemeral and fragmentaryleads it to a "preference for aesthetics over ethics" (116) and
ultimately to an apolitical stance.
Harvey's conclusions come directly from his interpretation of postmodernism, an
interpretation that is not, obviously enough, universally shared. Postmodernism does not
demand the deletion of history, nor does it relegate history to simply a collection of facts. It
does, however, argue that even a simple collection of facts is interpretive. Harvey suggests
that meta-narratives have been erased from existence. This is not the case. Meta-narratives
are alive and well in a postmodern age. They are, however, seen as narrative, not as absolute
truths, or ways of finding absolute truth. Linda Hutcheon's A Poetics ofPostmodernism
presents a far more sympathetic look at the issue.
For Hutcheon, interpretations of history are an important component to a postmodern
worldview, and everything (including history) must be examined in light of its context.
Hutcheon's definition of postmodernism reflects this focus; she identifies the postmodern as
"a problematizing force in our culture today: it raises questions about...the common-sensical
and the 'natural.' But it never offers answers that are anything but provisional and
contextually determined" (xi). Far from abandoning ethics in favor of a strictly aesthetic
approach, this questioning force that refuses to provide anything more than momentary
answers—answers dependent on context—can provide a fresh reevaluation of ethics.
Hutcheon continues her interpretation of postmodernism by addressing meta-
narratives. She disagrees with writers who, like Harvey, attack postmodernism on the
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grounds that it seeks to destroy our way of knowing the world. While she sees meta-
narratives as illusory, she doesn't believe postmodernists deny their existence: "such systems
are indeed attractive, perhaps even necessary; but this does not make them any the less
illusory" (6). She goes on to point out that, "those who lament the 'loss of meaning' in the
world or in art are really mourning the fact that knowledge is no longer primarily narrative
knowledge" (6). While postmodernists deny the Enlightenment notion that knowledge is
acquired in a progressive fashion and that the more knowledge one acquires the closer one
will be to the truth, they do not deny that one is capable of acquiring knowledge. Harvey
complained that the loss of a belief in meta-narratives leads to a shallow understanding of the
world. Hutcheon disagrees and argues that understanding the world has become even more
complicated than modernists believed. It is more complicated because postmodernists refuse
to take comfort in illusory meta-narratives.
Postmodernists believe that we place knowledge in narrative form because to know
anything seems to require some type of narrative framework. In this light, postmodernism
needs to be careful to avoid becoming another meta-narrative. With this in mind,
postmodern thinkers begin to understand and describe the world by challenging the
perspectives of narrative. As Hutcheon points out, many thinkers including Baudrillard,
Foucault, and Lyotard, have addressed this concern and have determined that, "any
knowledge cannot escape complicity with some meta-narrative.. .What they add, however, is
that no narrative can be a natural 'master* narrative: there are no natural hierarchies; there are
only those we construct" (13). Individuals are responsible for constructing or assenting to
the framework through which they understand the world. Starting here allows one to see the
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possibility of multiple frameworks, multiple ways of knowing andfunctioning in theworld.
It also allows one to recognize a flaw when one meta-narrativeclaims to hold universal truth.
Some have taken the postmodern idea of knowing through narrative and distorted it,
claiming that in a postmodern view everything is fictionalized. Thishas happened through
the presentation of postmodernhistory as something that did not exist, as something that is
simplymeaningless. Hutcheonrejects such a reading: "History is not madeobsolete: it is,
however, being rethought- as a humanconstruct. And in arguingthat historydoes not exist
except as text, it does not stupidlyand 'gleefully' deny that thepast existed, but only that its
accessibility to us now is entirely conditioned by textuality" (16). In other words, our
knowledge of the past is available only as text. Such an approach does not ruin history, nor
does it make history something that is no longer valid. Instead it focuses on the structure of
knowledge before it examines the content.
Postmodernists question our assumptions about history, and other systems of
knowledge. As Hutcheon argues, "Postmodernism questions centralized, totalized,
hierarchized, closed systems: questions, but does not destroy...It acknowledges the human
urge to make order, while pointing out that the orders we create are just that: human
constructs, not natural or given entities" (41-2). No system exists prior to humanity's
construction of that system, and when postmodernists see systems functioning as if they were
givens, as if they were a priori absolute truths, they are inclined to question them. It is not
that such systems don't have value; they certainly do. But the systems are by no means
permanent and eternal.
In light of this understanding of postmodemism, Harvey's claim that postmodern
thinking is strictly aesthetic, with little to no regard for ethics, seems hollow. In fact, in
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Hutchepn's discussion of history, and the telling of history, ethics seem to be a primary
concern. At the very least it is far more importantthan aesthetics. Hutcheon's conception of
postmodernism and its interpretation of history indicates that past events did exist. Our
understanding of history, however, is textual and only textual. She argues that
postmodernism, "reinstalls historical contexts as significant andevendetermining, but in so
doing, it problematizes the entire notionof historical knowledge...And the implication is that
there can be no single, essentialized, transcendent concept of 'genuine historicity'" (89).
While modem writers and thinkers recognized a complexity in searching for and finding the
truth, a postmodern view of the world implies that one can never get at an absolute truth;
there is not transcendent reality. The writer in the modem age then seeks to find one
meaning or truth, whereas the postmodern writer questions how we can know what we know.
The shift from searching for the truth to searching for truths is seen in what Hutcheon
calls historiographic metafiction. She defines this postmodem form of fiction as one that,
refutes the natural or common-sense methods of distinguishing between historical fact
and fiction. It refuses the view that only history has a truth claim, both by
questioning the ground of that claim in historiography and by asserting that both
history and fiction are discourses, human constructs, signifying systems, and both
derive their major claim to truth from that identity. (93)
Historiographic metafiction blurs the lines between history and fiction. In doing so it asks
the reader to focus on important postmodem questions. If what we know of our past is as
much a human constmct as the fictional stories we tell one another, then when we read
history, we must ask why the historians made the choices that were made. Why is one
history given favor and precedence over another? Why is American history taught as a
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history of the rich and powerful insteadof the poor andmigrant? Postmodernism in this light
becomes anythingbut apolitical. Further, this questioning impulse of postmodernism is not
limited to larger nationalhistories,but individual histories also are questioned. How one teUs
the story of his or her life becomesa matterof choice, not a "natural" or "given" truth.
The concern of postmodern ethics is directly addressed by Zygmunt Bauman. His
work Postmodern Ethics^ like many studies that explore postmodern issues, begins by setting
up postmodem ethics in relation to its modem counterpart. Bauman identifies "the great
issues of ethics" as "human rights, social justice, [and the] balance between peaceful co
operation and personal self-assertion, synchronizationof individual conduct and collective
welfare" (4). These issues are alive and well in a postmodem world; they are just looked at
differently than they were through modem eyes. Bauman argues that during the modem era
"men and women [were forced] into the condition of individuals, who found their lives
fragmented, split into many loosely related aims and functions" (6). As a result of this
fragmentation modem ethicists sought "an 'all-comprising' idea promoting a unitary vision
of the world" (6). In order to establish this "all-comprising" idea, freedom needed to be
limited. According to Bauman, "It was the tacit, but virtually exceptionless assumption of
modem ethical thought and of the practice it recommended, that when free.. .individuals
would need to be prevented from using their freedom to do wrong" (7). In other words, one
could choose to be irrational, but the choice would be a poor or harmful one.
Again, like Harvey's distinction between the modem and the postmodem, Bauman's
rests on the validity of universalizing. Modernists believed that after enough time and work
one could eventually discover concrete universalizing mles for moral conduct. But as
Bauman notes, "It is a disbelief in such a possibility that is po^ftnodem" (10). Seeing
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morality through postmodern eyesmeans rejecting anynotion of universalizing tendencies.
Baumanalso suggests a handful of positivepoints that areunique to a postmodern
perspective. Someof themore important onesfor a study of Auster's novels include human
ambivalence and moral responsibility. Bauman states that understanding postmodem
moralitymeans understanding that "humansare morally ambivalent*' (10). As a result, no
one code can be created as a guarantee for good moral choices. The first step of a
postmodemethics is the ability to "leam how to livewithoutsuch guarantees, andwith the
awareness that guarantees will never be offered—that a perfect society, as well as a perfect
human being, is not a viable prospect, while attempts to prove the contrary result in more
cmelty than humanity" (11).
Another major concem for Bauman is moral responsibility. He believes that a
universal code of ethics cannot exist and that we must cease presenting our individual or
societal ethics as universally moral and then coercing others into our "universals" (10-13).
This belief, however, does not free one from moral responsibility. Bauman argues that the
postmodem moral individual is for the "other." "Being for the other," according to Bauman,
is "the first reality of the self...It precedes all engagement with the Other, be it through
knowledge, evaluation, suffering or doing" (13). For Bauman the self and the moral self are
the same thing. Consequently morality is as diverse and fragmented as are individuals.
The first concem for Bauman's postmodem morality is human ambivalence. This
ambivalence asserts itself, oddly enough, in our desire for a set of unbreakable ethical
guidelines. We want "firm and trusty mles which may reassure us that once we followed
them, we could be sure to be in the right" (Bauman 20). It soon becomes obvious, however,
that even if these rules did exist, we would not be free from moral responsibility. As
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Bauman notes, "After all, it is each one of us on his or her own who has to decide which of
the conflicting rules to obey and which to disregard. The choice is...between different sets
of rules and different authorities preaching them" (20). There are multiple sets of rules that
claim to be universal. Therefore to follow a set of rules implies a choice, and therefore the
individual choosing is still responsible. As a result, the postmodern era is a period of
stronglyfelt moral ambiguity. These times offer us freedom of choice never before enjoyed,
but also cast us into a state of uncertainty never before so agonizing" and consequently "we
cannot help being suspicious about any claim to infallibility" (21). Not only does the
freedom of postmodernism come with uncertainty it also cautions individuals against people
who claim to have certain and unchanging answers.
Localized or situational systems of ethical conduct are not anymore helpful. They fall
prey to the same problems as their universal counterparts: "Both intend to expropriate the
individual from moral choice; or at least from exercising free choice in such areas of life as
are considered relevant to the 'common weal': in the case of conflict, they want the
individuals to opt for the action that promotes the common cause—over and above all other
considerations" (Bauman 46). While localized ethical codes do not seek to limit ethics to a
singular system, they do place a limit on the number of ethical systems. One's local
community takes on the same properties as a universal system of ethics and as a result
individual freedom is limited, or has the appearance of being limited.
Bauman's postmodern ethics is then focused on the freedom of the individual. Using
Emmanuel Levinas, Bauman draws a sharp distinctionbetween "being with the other" and
"being for the other." The former is a symmetrical system, one dependenton reciprocity.
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The latter is an asymmetrical system, one that depends solely on the individual. Bauman
explains his position in traditional terms:
Being a moral person means that I am my brother's keeper. But this also means that I
ammybrother's keeper whether or notmybrother sees his ownbrotherly duties the
same way I do; and that lam my brother's keeper whatever other brothers, real or
putative, do or may do. At least, I can be properlyhis keeper only if I act as if I was
the only one obliged^ or even likely, to act this way.. .It is this uniqueness (not
'generalizability'!), and this non-reversibility, which puts me in the moral
relationship. (51)
Being "my brother's keeper" is the only way to "be for the other." It requires each individual
to freely choose the freedom and autonomy of others. "Being with others" creates morality
only to the extent that my actions will be appreciated by others, and to the extent that they
will do the same to me. Such a morality creates rules and regulations that connect
individuals in a society, but also consequently limit the freedom and autonomy of others.
While much of postmodern ethics contains echoes of existentialism, in particular the
sense of human ambiguity, Bauman—again using Levinas—takes care to distinguish his
ethics from the ethics of existentialism. Bauman and Levinas suggest that "First philosophy
is an ethics.. .Ethics comes before ontology.. .Moral relationship comes before being" (71).
If ontology is first, if it precedes everything, according to Bauman, all we can hope for from
ethics is a "being with" structure. Bauman and Levinas believe this because, as they argue,
"From the perspective of ontology, moral relationship can be only a later addition, an artifice,
never fully legitimate, forever an alien and awkward body, forever questionable and cast in a
position in which apology is constantly demanded and never really accepted: one cannot
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derive the 'ought' from the 'is'; one cannot arguevaluesstartingfrom facts" (71). This may
be the case, but their assessment of ontology sounds far more postmodern than does their
own "first philosophy." It sounds, and Bauman suggests as much, that this "first philosophy"
is a given, and if it is a given it has with it the taste of modernity, the taste of the universally
applied.
Postmodernists will not deny that morality could have a transcendent universal
nature, but what they insist upon is that the only way humans can have an understanding of
such a nature is through the text we give it. In this sense, morality is still very much a human
construct, and it certainly comes after being. Existentialism, while not designed to be an
answer to the problem of postmodern ethics, can provide some insights. Jean Paul Sartre's
"Existentialism is a Humanism" addresses some of the difficulties individuals have in
making decisions, and the anguish, abandonment, and despair that accompanies these
choices. In this way Sartre's ethics are similar to Bauman's.
Existentialism and Existential Ethics
Sartre begins "Existentialism is a Humanism" by defining existential thought as the notion
that each human exists prior to having an essence. The individual is not defined by how he
or she measures up to some preexisting concept of human nature. Instead, one is defined by
his or her actions. As Sartre argues, "Man is nothing else but that which he makes of
himself (349). Sartre then claims that by choosing, the individual gives his or her choice
meaning and value. While this situation may provide an initial sense of liberation, it is
ultimately a situation that bestows a great amount of responsibility on the individual. In fact,
the responsibility is for all humanity; as Sartre argues, "the first effect of existentialism is that
18
it puts everyman in possession of himself as he is, andplaces the entireresponsibility for his
existence squarely uponhis ownshoulders. And, when we say thatmanis responsible for
himself, we do not mean that he is responsible only for his own individuality, but that he is
responsible for all men" (349-50). The actionchosenhas no value until it is chosen. Once
this happens an actionhas value, and by givingit value the individual (who cannot do
otherwise) argues that what is, ought to be. While Baumann and Levinas believe we cannot
"derive the ought from the is," Sartre shows that we can and must. The individual who
shrinks from this responsibility lives in bad faith or self-deception; he or she lies to him or
herself about existence. Being asked to make these decisions leads to the anguish,
abandonment, and despair mentioned above.
Choices and the action based on those choices create anguish because of the
enormous weight of choosing for humanity. Sartre states that, "When a man commits
himself to anything, fully realizing that he is not only choosing what he will be, but is
thereby at the same time a legislator deciding for the whole of mankind... [he] cannot escape
from the sense of complete and profund [sic] responsibility" (351). The source of such
anguish rests in the difficult question one must ask him or herself, "So every man ought to
say, 'Am I really a man who has the right to act in such a manner that humanity regulates
itself by what I do*" (352). And yet, as Sartre maintains, if one is honest, one recognizes this
plight as the condition for action.
Abandonment accompanies anguish, because once one comes to terms with the fact
that he or she is responsible for humanity, he or she becomes upset that a universal system is
not readily at hand to help. Sartre looks at the absence of a universal system as a
condemnation, "Everything is indeed permitted if God does not exist, and man is in
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consequence forlorn, for he cannot find anything to depend upon eitherwithin or outside
himself...one will never be able to explain one's action by reference to a given and specific
human nature...That is what I mean when I say man is condemned to be free" (353). This
explanation for existential abandonment lines up well with the postmodern notion that
universals do not exist and that there is no human nature, no absolute truth. The individual
must choose and he or she must choose without help of any kind, because even if it is
offered, the choice still rests with the individual. Consequently one feels anguish and
abandonment.
With anguish and abandonment, existential choice also creates a sense of despair.
Despite the enormous responsibility the individual does not have hope that his or her choice
will last beyond the moment. The individual has no hope because, as Sartre states, "I cannot
count upon men whom I do not know, I cannot base my confidence upon human goodness or
upon man's interest in the good of society, seeing that man is free and that there is no human
nature which I can take as foundational" (357-8). In other words, each individual feels
anguish and abandonment because of the responsibility of choosing, but he or she must also
recognize that everyone is confronted with the same responsibility and others may very
easily choose differently.
These "others" who create in the individual a sense of despair are also responsible
and necessary for the individual to understand his or her own freedom. They are not the
cause of such freedom, but they are crucial to an understanding of it. Sartre describes the
confrontation of the self and the other as indispensable, "I cannot obtain any truth whatsoever
about myself, except through the mediation of another. The other is indispensable to my
existence, and equally so to any knowledge I can have of myself. Under these conditions, the
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intimate discovery of myself is at the same time the revelation of the other as a freedom
which confronts mine" (361). It is not only important for the individual to be confronted by
another, but that the other is free to do so, therefore the other's freedom is as important to the
individual as the individual's own.
It is in terms of freedom that Sartre suggests one can judge another. He sums up the
existential condition, "Since we have defined the situation of man as one of free choice,
without excuse and without help, any man who takes refuge behind the excuse of his
passions, or by inventing some deterministic doctrine, is a self-deceiver" (365). Other
translations refer to this self-deception as bad faith.
Joseph S. Catalano's book. Good Faith and Other Essays: Perspectives on a Sartrean
Ethics, defines ethical choices in terms of good and bad faith. For Catalano, abandonment
reaches into an individual's personal history. He compares life and the choices that come
with it to an unfinished painting. A painting can seem to depict a serious situation until the
protagonist is given a smirk, "In a similarway, for Sartre, although we have onlyone life to
live and cannot change our past, our real freedom is thatwe are free to performacts that give
newmeanings to our past and open new possibilities for our future" (79). Living and acting
in existential good faith requires one to recognize abandonment and its connection to
freedom. In this wayone cannot defend his or her actions by arguing, "it's in mynature to
act in this way." While one's past actions definewho one is, they do not determine one's
future actions; an individual is always free to act differently. The inability for an individual
to relyupon his or hercharacter heightens thesense of abandonment, but it also provides an
almost infinite amount of hope for existential ethics.
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In Sartre's Two Ethics^ Thomas C. Anderson's presents a scenario and demonstrates
an application of existential ethics. In the scenario an individual has consistently acted
cowardly. He or she cannot honestly deny his or her cowardice, and at the same time he or
she cannot say: "I am a coward." To do so would suggest that individuals are fixed in their
current and past situations and deny those individuals freedom to choose differently.
Appealing to his scenario, Anderson argues that such'T am" statements are made in bad
faith, because "he is a coward (in terms of facticity) but is not a coward (in terms of
freedom)" (15). One is in bad faith then when he or she either denies the impact and
influenceof previouschoices, or whenhe or she denies the freedomto choose againstpast
choices. Denying either the facticity or the freedom of existence is an act of bad faith, and so
an application of existential ethics involves identifying those who choose to embrace self-
deception.
Catalano would agreewithAnderson's understanding of bad faith, anddevelop it.
Conceptsof good and bad faith are not limited to absolute"I am" statements; they touchour
daily choices. According to Catalano's reading of Sartre, the way one makeschoiceswill
determine if one is in goodor bad faith, andhowonemakes choices depends on howhe or
she appeals to the availableevidence. Catalano argues that, "good faith always confrontsthe
evidence first, or at least is willing to examine the evidence of its beliefs. The fact that there
is no absolute normdoes not prevent one in good faith from seeing that there can be a critical
difference betweenhavingmore or less evidenceabout belief* (139). Evidence for an
existentialist, andfor a postmodernist, cannot be perfect; it will neverriseabove the levelof
ambiguity. This, however, does not mean evidence should not be consulted or evaluated. To
deny the place ofevidence ina world without absolutes, arguing that anything is possible, is
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to live in bad faith. As Catalano argues "Bad faith aims at stability of beliefs that evidence
cannot provide. It is thus more a belief in belief itself rather than a belief arising from
evidence" (140).
Simone de Beauvoir addresses the "anything goes" notion of existentialism in The
Ethics ofAmbiguity. In it she quotes from TheBrothers Karamazov to set the foundation
for her discussion: "If God does not exist, everything is permitted" (15). Similar to Sartre's
argument in "Existentialism is a Humanism," Beauvoir argues that the source of human
values is in human actions. If one chooses the conditions and values under which he or she
lives, it is logical to conclude that "everything is permitted." Beauvoir agrees that this is a
logical conclusion, but she will deny that such a conclusion leads to the end of ethics.
Instead, "man is abandoned on the earth, because his acts are definitive, absolute
engagements. He bears the responsibility for a world which is not the work of a strange
power, but of himself, where his defeats are inscribed, and his victories as well" (16). It is
because one is abandoned to create values for him or herself that an individual's decisions
are charged with ethical concerns. There is no one else to appeal to, no guide to turn to so as
to avoid making the difficult decisions.
Beauvoir continues her argument by stating that "it is not impersonal universal man
who is the source of values, but the plurality of concrete, particular men projecting
themselves toward their ends on the basis of situations whose particularity is as radical and as
irreducible as subjectivity itself (17-18). All humans choose and the results of these choices
are what we call values. Beauvoir comes back to a similar point at the end of her work. She
notes that "no behavior is ever authorized to begin with, and one of the concrete
consequences of existentialist ethics is the rejection of all the previous justifications which
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might be drawn from the civilization, the age, and the culture; it is the rejection of every
principle of authority" (142). At its heart this is a postmodern belief. A combination of
existential and postmodern ethics leads to the rejection or dismissal of any authority that aims
to be universal.
Conclusion
The criticism of existential ethics is that it does not provide a practical scale for doing
good and avoiding evil. Beauvoir addresses these concerns: "It will be said that these
considerations remain quite abstract. What must be done, practically? Which action is good?
Which is bad?...Ethics does not furnish recipes any more than do science and art. One can
merely propose methods" (134). It would be disingenuous for existentialists to offer an
ethics that favors certain actions over others. Instead they propose methods, and it may be
for this reason that they feel more comfortable showing how those methods work in
situations.
For the study of Auster's fiction, the bridge between postmodernists and
existentialists can be constructed out of their shared concern with fragmentation.
Postmodernists insist upon this fragmentation, and like McHale, Auster is willing to embrace
it to such an extent that he can freely believe in multiple universes. This belief in
fragmentation is further codified (at least to the extent that anything in pieces can be
codified) by Hutcheon's insistence upon the textualization of knowledge. This insistence
continues to point to an underlying uncertainty to life.
Bauman accepts this uncertainty and argues that as a result no one code of ethics can
guarantee good moral conduct. For Bauman, the role of postmodern ethics is to help people
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"learn how to live without such guarantees" (11). Bauman's way to live without guarantees
is to "be for the other," a proposalthat relieson the freedom of both the self and the other.
Such a freedom allows for a multiplicity of views and possibly a multiplicity of realities.
While Bauman tries to distance himself from existentialism, there is certainly a
connection betweenhis postmodern ethics and existential ones. At the heart of Sartrean
ethics is individual choice. Choices are made independently and consequently bring about a
feeling of abandonment. In line with postmodern ethicists, Sartreanexistentialists recognize
the impossibility of a universal moral code. This recognition causes the sense of
abandonment, and with abandonment feelings of anguish and despair. For Sartre, and other
existential ethicists, seeing the condition of humanity as alone and condemned to freedom,
and acting with this knowledge is a sign of good faith. To deny either one's freedom to
choose or the significance of choosing is to act in bad faith.
Wayne Booth argues that narratives providing ethical advice offer "a distinctive,
engaging way of being together" (216). In Moon Palace and Leviathan, Auster's
"distinctive, engaging way" embraces the postmodern condition and sees in existentialism a
method for acting in such a world. As it is for Bauman and Sartre, freedom is essential to
Auster. When his characters act in good faith they accept personal freedom, the freedom of
others, and the ramifications of freedom. When his characters act poorly, or in bad faith,
they find some way to deny these elements of freedom.
In my second chapter I will address Moon Palace and focus my attention on M. S.
Fogg. By and large, Fogg fails to achieve the blending of postmodern and existential ethics.
But by demonstrating Fogg's failure, Auster shows the reader how not to act in a postmodern
world. At times when Fogg is at his most lucid, he sees the postmodern condition and tries to
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embrace it. Auster, however, won't fully experiment with a character of good faith until
Leviathan.
I will cover Leviathan in my third and final chapter. In it I will split my focus
between the novel's two protagonists, Ben Sachs and Peter Aaron. In Sachs, Auster is again
experimenting with a character of bad faith. Sachs routinely deceives himself, and he does
so by attempting to impose universal laws on the world. Aaron, on the other hand, is
Auster's first attempt to draw a character of good faith. While Aaron stumbles at times,
ultimately he accepts both the fragmentation of postmodemity and the freedom of
existentialism.
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CHAPTER 2: MOON PALACE AND FOGG'S FAILURE
Before beginning my examination of Moon Palace^ I will summarize some critical
approaches to Auster's fiction. In many discussions of Auster's work, critics point to his
postmodemtendencies as something obvious, almosta given. They find throughouthis work
concems with the uncertainty in epistemological and ontological foundations, a strong
presence of intertextuality, and an unmistakable blurring of the imaginary line that separates
"reality" from "fiction." One example of this approach to Auster's works is Aliki Varvogli's
The World that is the Book: Paul Auster's Fiction^ a study of Auster's novels through
Leviathan. In a discussion of The New YorkTrilogy^ Varvogli argues that Auster "crosses
ontological boundaries by creating a character named Paul Auster in City ofGlass, and by an
authorial intrusion in The Locked Room" (4). He also suggests that within the collection of
detective novellas is an astonishing amount of explicit references to other literature
including, but not limited to, Hawthorne's short stories, Thoreau's Walden, Don Quixote,
Borges, Kafka, and Beckett (5).
Varvogli sees ontological indeterminacy and intertextuality as the most remarkable
elements of Auster's fiction. Working from interviews and memoirs, Varvogli notes that
Auster sees Quinn, the protagonist of City ofGlass, as an exercise in authorial imagination.
Auster imagines what his life would have been like had he never met his second wife, and the
result is Quinn. Varvogli also notes that Auster knew a man who distributed fifteen thousand
dollars in fifty-dollar increments to strangers {Moon Palace) and another who accidentally
killed himself when a bomb he wasmakingdetonated in his hands {Leviathan). In addition
toAuster's personal imaginings and friendships, "Thepractice of constantly blurring theline
that oughtto separate fact from fiction is nowhere more pronounced thanin those novels in
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which Auster deals with history and politics, and tackles some of his country's most
cherished myths" (Varvogli 8). In this way Varvogli's sense of Auster's postmodernism
aligns it with Hutcheon's historiographic metafiction.
Dennis Barone is fully aware of the mingling of history and fiction in Auster's work.
In his introduction to Beyond the RedNotebook: Essays on PaulAuster, Barone argues that,
"Auster's work always contains aspects of the author's own life, references to other
literature, and descriptions of actual historical figures and events. This is historigraphic
metafiction as Linda Hutcheon defines it" (5). According to Barone, however, Auster uses
metafictional devices differently than his postmodern predecessors and peers; he does not
"frustrate or disrupt the reading process" (7). Consequently, Barone sees Auster as popular
and postmodern. Auster's accessibility, according to Barone, rests in his ability to address
postmodern ideas in ways distinct from other contemporary writers through his presentation
of "the signifier and signified" (7). Barone believes Auster attempts to "return thing and
thing named to a state of tenuous stability. This approach to reference is part of [Auster's]
synthesis of postmodern themes and premodem moral questions" (7).
Auster is clearly a postmodernist, and to suggest that he seeks a reconciliation of
signifier and referent is to deny a major element of his fiction. A misunderstanding of some
of the more widely explored ideas of postmodernism is only one of the problems with
Barone's analysis. Auster can't seek a "tenuous stability" between "the signifier and
signified" and be a postmodernist, at least using the definition of postmodernism developed
in the first chapter of my essay. The former is a modem goal akin to the argument that
although the world is incredibly complex, with enough study one will be able to understand it
at a fundamental level. Secondly, Barone's argument suggests that, "moralquestions" are
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somehow unconnected to "postmodern themes." ForAuster, questions of morality walk
hand-in-hand with many of the themes of postmodernism.
InAnArt ofDesire: ReadingPaul Auster, Bemd Herzogenrath readingdiffers from
Barone's in his understanding of signifierand signified. For Hertzogenrath, Auster never
attempts to reconcile "thingand thing named." He defines postmodern fiction as works that
explore "the dichotomy of 'reality' and 'fiction,' focusing on questions of intertextuality, the
narratological structure of a text, strategies of representation, epistemological andontological
consequences of the questioning of hitherto 'fundamental certainties,' such as the possibility
of representation, the author as origin of the text, consciousness as origin of the subject" (3).
Hertzogenrath suggests that operating under this definition the "First Generation" of
American postmodernists (he uses Earth, Barthelme, andSukenickas his sampleclass for
this generation) experimented with and at times cast aside "traditional" elements of
storytelling "such as plot, character, [and] the linear/logical structureof 'beginning-middle-
end'" (3). He then looks as Auster as an American postmodernist and claims that although
he may "revert" back to some more traditional storytelling tropes, his "realism" never
suggests a clear or notion of referentiality, a system in which language has "mimetic"
relation with reality (3). In other words, Auster's postmodernism still contains the blurring
of "reality" and "fiction," intertextuality, and a questioning of "fundamental certainties"; his
fiction, however, accomplishes these themes through plot and character driven stories, in
what Barone might call premodem narratives.
Aside from a few exceptions, the way Auster critics discuss the postmodernism in his
novels is consistent with the definition of postmodernism outlined in my first chapter. Moon
Palace fits within this postmodern outlook. It suggests, as Harvey notes that no view of the
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world can be absolute and universally true. The novel also foregrounds, as McHale suggests,
the notion of multiple realities and how one can function within "a plurality of universes"
(27). And like Lyotard, the novel suggests that the way most of these universes are
experienced inMoonPalace is through"an indeterminate numberof languagegames" (46).
In addition to these postmodern elements. MoonPalace, likemany of Auster's critics have
pointed out, is an example of historiographic metafiction in that it actively seeks to pointto
the illusions, and at times overwhelming illusions, of meta-narratives. This chapterwill
address these elements of postmodernism in tum. I will start by addressing M. S. Fogg's
recognition of postmodernism and the Jamesonian schizophrenia that results. Then I will
tum toMoon Palace's historiographic metafiction, andconclude the chapterwith an
exploration of Fogg's choices, in light of existential ethics.
Fogg's Hunger and Schizophrenia
The opening of thenovel confronts the theme of fragmentation. ThefirstpartofMoon
Palace is dominated byFogg's attempts to cope with the death ofhisuncle Victor. Fogg,
functioning as thestory's narrator, alerts the reader to this death bysuggesting that the news
causesa profoundchange in his life and, as a result,he "began to vanish into anotherworld"
(3). Throughout thecourse of the novel, Auster will present multiple worlds through his
narrator. Thepersonal histories of Fogg, his grandfather Effing, andhis fatherBarber, and
the various means ofpresenting them are justa few ofthe worlds. They are also combined
with thevarious ways Foggrestructures hisown past.
Operating inmultiple realities is familiar to Fogg and has been since his time growing
up under the care ofhis uncle Victor. On a small scale, Victor himself isFogg's model for
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operating in "a plurality of universes." While a talented musician, Victor never became
successful because he saw many worlds outside the music realm, "So many things, in fact,
that he was often overwhelmed by them. Being the sort of person who always dreams of
doing something else while occupied, he could not sit down to practice a piece without
pausing to work out a chess problem in his head, could not play chess without thinking about
the failures to the Chicago Cubs" (5). Baseball leads him to Shakespeare and Shakespeare
leads him back to his clarinet. These distinct realms may not be considered separate
universes, but Victor operated in many fantasy worlds as well. To offset the harsh world
they lived in, Victor and a young Fogg would create universes. Fogg narrating in retrospect
sees this game as a means of coping with loss: "we had developed a game of inventing
countries together, imaginary worlds that overturned the laws of nature. Some of the better
ones took weeks to perfect, the maps I drew of them hung in a place of honor above the
kitchen table. The land of Sporadic Light, for example, and the Kingdom of One-Eyed Men"
(6).
From an early age Fogg is asked to see the world as a fragmented place, one in which
other worlds are possible, if only in the imagination. With this fragmentation and
multiplicity comes the notion that objects, words, and events can have various and at times
contradictory meanings. To a certain extent the adolescent and collegiate Fogg recognizes
this, but he is also quick to assign absolute meaning. When he moves into his apartment,
afterhis freshman year at Columbia, he realizes that if he stands in the right place he is able
to see a sliver of Broadway. What he sees in this sliver is a neon sign for Moon Palace, a
Chinese restaurant. He knows that the sign is an advertisement for the restaurant, "but the
force withwhich thosewords assaulted [him] drowned out everypractical reference and
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association. They were magic letters, and they hung there in the darkness like a message
from the sky itself (17). The sign creates an association withhis uncleVictor's band, the
Moon Men, and at the time Fogg concludes, "that this small apartment was indeed where
[he] was meant to live" (17). A decidedly un-postmodem idea, Fogg will occasionally force
the conceptof fate into the narrative to comforthimself, to help himbelieve in a meaningful
universe. The scene described above is only a minor example of such self-deception, or bad
faith. Fogg has moved into an apartment of his own for the first time in his life. He is
understandably apprehensive and a bit frightened. As a result, he searches for solace in a
belief in fate. By painting such a picture, Auster shows how the concepts like fate, and other
beliefs in a natural order, are human constructs. Auster doesn't condemn Fogg for embracing
fate, instead he rationalizes Fogg's actions, but he does show it as an act of bad faith.
Shortly after moving into his apartment, Fogg learns of Victor's death. This death
brings about Fogg's self-imposed starvation and more blind grasps for absolute meaning. As
the narrator, Fogg tells the reader that he began to vanish into another world. At the time of
his vanishing, Fogg believed his access to this different world gave him special insight into
the fundamental nature of reality. Such an understanding starts with a free association that
resembles his uncle's, but without any of his uncle's control. Fogg describes the mental
acrobatics accomplished after his vanishing:
The words Moon Palace began to haunt my mind with all the mystery and fascination
of an oracle. Everything was mixed up in it at once: Uncle Victor and China, rocket
ships and music, Marco Polo and the American West. I would look out at the sign
and start to think about electricity. That would lead me to the blackout during my
freshman year, which in turn would lead me to the baseball games played at Wrigley
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Field, which would then lead me back to Uncle Victor and the memorial candles
burning on my windowsill. One thought kept giving way to another, spiraling into
ever larger masses of connectedness. The idea of voyaging into the unknown, for
example, and the parallels between Columbus and the astronauts. The discovery of
America as a failure to reach China; Chinese food and my empty stomach; thought, as
in food for thought, and the head as a palace of dreams. I would think: the Apollo
Project; Apollo, the god of music; UncleVictor and the Moon Men traveling out
West. I would think: the West; the war against the Indians; the war in Vietnam, once
called Indochina. I would think: weapons, bombs, explosion; nuclear clouds in the
desert of Utah and Nevada; and then I would ask myself—why does the American
West look so much like the landscape of the moon? It went on and on like that and
the more I opened myself to these secret correspondences, the closer I felt to
understanding some fundamental truth about the world. (32-3)
The narratingFogg frames this impressive association with indications of insanity. Prior to
telling the readerwhatwasgoing through hismind, he suggests that he mayhavebeen
"delirious with hunger" (32). After describing the attainment of fundamental truth he admits,
"I was goingmad, perhaps" (33). The narratorthen tells us that such "clarity" only lasted for
a few days; afterwards hewoke to find himself "back in theworld of fragments" (33).
Fredric Jameson's description ofpostmodern schizophrenia may help us understand Fogg's
mental state.
In Postmodernism, or The CulturalLogic ofLate Capitalism, Jameson argues for a
non-clinical understanding of schizophrenia, byappealing to Jacques Lacan: "Lacan
describes schizophrenia as a breakdown inthe signifying chain, that is, the interlocking
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syntagmatic series of signifiers which constitutes an utterance of a meaning" (26). Jameson
goes on to further detail Lacan's understanding of language and meaning:
His conception of the signifying chain essentially presupposes... the proposition that
meaning is not a one-to-one relationship between signifier and signified.. .Meaning
on the new view is generated by the movement from signifier to signifier. What we
generally call the signified.. .is now rather to be seen as a meaning-effect, as that
objective mirage of signification generated and projected by the relationship of
signifiers among themselves. When that relationship breaks down, when the links of
the signifying chain snap then we have schizophrenia in the form of a rubble of
distinct and unrelated signifiers. (26)
In other words, within a postmodern context meaning can only be hinted at, and such hints
only come from gleaning an understanding from signifiers playing off of each other.
Schizophrenia is the consequence of no longer being able to obtain the "meaning-effect."
Instead, one can only see "a rubble of distinct and unrelated signifiers." Fogg's hunger
induced delirium is an excellent example of this type of schizophrenia.
The signifying chain has fallen apart for Fogg, and consequently he moves illogically
from one unrelated signifier to another. What is frightening about Fogg's schizophrenia is
the way he understands it. As Jameson tells us, there is a tendency in postmodern culture to
read a schizophrenic reaction like Fogg's with "joyous intensities," because it can displace
"the older affects of anxiety and alienation" (29). The most one can hope for in a
postmodern world is an uncertain glimpse of meaning, one found by playing with signifiers.
This is an unwelcome state, and when Fogg is schizophrenic he feels close to "understanding
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some fundamental truth about the world." When he leaves this state he sees only
fragmentation, he returns to anxiety and alienation.
When Fogg, both as narrator and character, is thinking clearly, he sees in the world
nothing but uncertainty. After a meal courtesy of Kitty Wu and friends, the young Fogg
concludes that he must plan for his future, but he "had lost the ability to think ahead, and no
matter how hard [he] tried to imagine the future, [he] could not see it, [he] could not see
anything at all...The moments unfurled one after the other, and at each moment the future
stood before [him] as a blank, a white page of uncertainty" (41). It is during moments like
these that Auster's characters most accurately reflect the philosophic vision in his novels. If
the future is a white page, Fogg has the opportunity to write on it whatever he chooses, but
this freedom plagues him because of the uncertainty of an unfinished page.
Auster's character's, however, rarely maintain this vision, instead they choose to flee
into a world with inherent meaning. On Fogg's first day as a homeless man, he finds a ten-
dollar bill on the sidewalk. The narrating Fogg describes the scene and the significance he
attributed to it at the time: "My mind was already in a tumult, and rather than simply call it a
stroke of good luck, I persuaded myself that somethingprofoundly important had just
happened: a religious event, an out-and-out miracle.. .Everything was going to work
out...everythingwas going to come out right in the end" (51). Again, Fogg takes a chance
event and assigns it meaning that it does not inherently have. Moreover,whilehe assigns a
natural meaning to events, he simultaneously admits to having a clouded perception of the
world; he claims his mindwasin "a tumult." While not quiteschizophrenic, Foggis acting
poorly by consciously deciding to deny his postmodern condition.
35
In "Chance in ContemporaryNarrative: The Example of Paul Auster," Steven E.
Alford suggests that Auster's characters assignmeaning to chance events because they do not
want to admit the unpredictability of the universe. They do not want to admit this because to
do so would admit a frightening world. Alford argues that, for Auster, "the very act of
attempting to understand the world and ourselves is itself a fictional construct, one bom of
our timorous epistemological cowardice. The world and the lives we live in are literally
'meaningless'; meaningfulness, the act of signification, is for Auster a supplementary act on
our part.. .to keep away the frightening beast of chance" (61). In spite of the
meaninglessness that is professed in Auster's works, Alford sees indications that
coincidences are signs to unlocking the mystery of the universe. Looking at the scene of
delusion brought about by hunger, Alford suggests that "Although [Fogg] later loses this
sense of mystic insight, the feeling remains that correspondences—coincidences, chance
connections among disparate elements of the world—are an entry point to revealing the
world ordinarily shielded from us by our intrusive consciousness" (68), Alford then
concludes from this reading that, "Both Fogg and Auster claim that coincidence, properly
understood, gives one an insight into the nature of the world" (68).
Auster seems, then, to put forth two arguments, one claiming that the world is
meaningless and unknowable, the other suggests that with enough understanding of
coincidence one can unlock the mysteries of the universe. Alford reconciles these two views
by suggesting that they operate under differing notions of time. For Alford, '*Auster*s random
world is that of a life (or text) lived forward; it's one damn thing after another, with no
seemingmeaning. Meaning arises owing to an act of signification that ascribes acts as
meaningful insofar as they are part of a causal chain linked to an event deemed significant"
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(77). In other words, for Auster, life lived in the present is bound to be meaningless because
of the uncertainty of living. When we tell the story of our lives we can ferret out what has
become significant and look at chance events as meaningftil forerunners to moments of
significance. Problems arise for Auster's characters when they begin to see the events of the
world having significance beyond the significance assigned to them by individuals telling
stories.
Fogg makes such a mistake with his self-imposed starvation. His goal was to find a
meaning to the universe, outside of his own personal understanding of it. He was looking for
universal and absolute truth, and was necessarily going to fail. He describes his intentions to
an army psychiatrist, "I thought that by abandoning myself to the chaos of the world, the
world might ultimately reveal some secret harmony to me, some form or pattern that would
help me to penetrate myself.. .1 failed miserably.. .1nevertheless believe that I'm a better
person for it" (80). This is one of the first indications that Fogg has taken on a modernist
view of a postmodern world. He believes that if he can get close enough he can grasp some
universal truth.
The world Auster has created for Fogg to live in presents him with evidence to
suggest that no matter how much knowledge he acquires, or how many insights he has access
to, the world will still be constantly changing. WhenFoggbeginshis work for Effinghe is
initiallypuzzled by the wayEffing presentshimself. On one day he wouldbe "wearinga
pair of darkblind-man'sglasses" on another, a blackpatch covering eacheye. Onyet
another dayhe waswearing "normal prescription glasses." The result is disorienting for
Fogg, "It was hard for me to tell if those eyes could see or not. There were moments when I
was convinced that it was all a bluff and that he could see as sharply as I did; at other
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moments I became just as convinced that he was totally blind" (109 emphasis added). The
evidence presented can lead equally to two contradictory readings. Fogg sees this for
himself, "It was as though I was trying to discover some truth in [Effing's eyes], some
opening that would lead me directly into the darkness of his skull. I never got anywhere with
it, however. For all the hundreds of hours I spent gazing into them. Effing's eyes never told
me a thing" (110). And for all his attempts neither will the universe.
Ultimately Fogg is asked to assume that Effing is blind. One of his duties as Effmg's
body man is to describe New York to Effmg during their walks. Fogg assumes that this task
will be simple, but Effing's bombardment of insults convinces him otherwise. Fogg finds it
difficult to connect the signifier with the signified, because of "the mutabihty of those things,
the way they changed according to the force and angle of the light, the way their aspect could
be altered by what was happening around them: a person walking by, a sudden gust of wind,
an odd reflection" (122). The objects and people of the world are constantly changing, not
only because of their interaction with each other, but also because of their existence in time.
In the latter sense, "the same brick was never really the same. It was wearing out,
imperceptibly crumbling under the effects of the atmosphere, the cold, the heat, the storms
that attacked it, and eventually if one could watch it over the centuries, it would no longer be
there" (122). Moreover, even if one had the ability to freeze time and stop change, the world
is finally only understandable through language. Consequently Fogg's world is going to
differ from Effing's because the way they describe the world will differ. When Fogg is
successful he understands this point: "I discovered that the more air I left around a thing, the
happier the results, for that allowed Effing to do the crucial work on his own: to construct an
imageon the basis of a few hints, to feel his ownmind traveling toward the thing I was
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describing for him" (123). To use Jameson's words, Fogg allows Effing to move from
"signifier to signifier" and create his own "meaning-effect." By doing this, Fogg embraces
his postmodern condition and acts in good faith. His time as Effing's body man is as close as
he ever gets to representing Auster's postmodern and existential ethic.
Moon Palace as Historiographic Metafiction
The subjectivity involved in connecting the world and the language used to describe the
world is a major element of Auster's fiction, according to Aliki Varvogli. Fogg's description
of the world moves beyond describing objects to describing events. Varvogli notes that "In
Auster's fiction, the emphasis is always on subjectivity which stems from the loss of faith in
grand, totalizing narratives.. .By rejecting notions of authenticity, or unadulterated reality, the
author is seen to question not only the status of the past he inherits, but also his own
contribution, his own interaction with the world around him" (117). For Auster everything
falls into to territory of language, so just as objectschangebased on the descriptions of those
objects, so does the past changebased on howwe discuss the past. In this way, Auster's
novels andparticularly Moon Palace andLeviathan canbe read as historiographic
metafiction.
Hutcheon sees the roleof historiographic metafiction as one that challenges the
notion of a clearly defined line between history and fiction. In this way historiographic
metafiction asks readers to see the narrative qualities in ideas that have traditionally been
regarded as absolute truths. Moon Palace^ ashistoriographic metafiction, tackles the
American myth ofManifest Destiny. The major historical elements incorporated into the
novel are that of the 1969moon landing and the settlement of theAmericanWest. The idea
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of new frontiers and settling those frontiers is addressed early in the novel. The first sentence
sets the storyduring "the summer thatmenfirst walked on themoon" (1). Additionally,
when Fogggoesoff to school, Victorgives him 1,492 books, his entirecollection. It is a
number Victorgives significance to and tells Foggthat 1,492 is "A propitious number...since
it evokes the memoryof Columbus's discovery of America, and the college you're going to
was named after Columbus" (13). Historiographicmetafiction places the fiction in a
historical setting, and it questions the telling of that history. Auster does both.
Auster not only placesMoonPalace withina specific time, he calls into questionour
assumptions about that time. On the day he sells the last of his 1,492books,Fogg takes the
money and stopsby a bar for a few beers. It is at this bar that he watches the moon landing.
After the broadcast of the landing, "the president spoke. In a solenm, deadpan voice, he
declared this to be the greatest event since the creation of man.. .But for all the absurdity of
that remark, there was one thing no one could challenge: since the day he was expelled form
Paradise, Adam had never been this far from home" (31). While the concept of Manifest
Destiny is not explicitly addressed, its spirit is present. Hana Shiloh's study PaulAuster and
the Postmodern Quest argues for "the symbolic significance of the space program in
American history and ideology. The conquest of the moon was imprinted on the collective
consciousness as the 20'** century version of the conquest of the West, the final stage inthe
fulfillment ofManifest Destiny" (130). By connecting the moon landing to creation Fogg
suggests that the president views the history of humanity as a history of progress: out of the
garden, across the Atlantic, through the American West and finally into space. The patrons
at the bar with Fogg laughed at the idea, and Fogg himself reads the event differently than the
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president. He doesn't see it as a progression to something great, but as a movement away
from home.
Fogg also consciously blurs fact and fiction in his lecture on the history of moon
landings. He delivers his performance to KittyWu's friends on the day she took pity on him
and allowed him to join them in their breakfast. Midway through his talk someone tries to
correct him and tell him that Cyrano de Bergerac was not a real man, but a creation of a
playwright. Fogg corrects this person with a biography of Cyrano and he finishes with, "This
was no figment, my friends. He was a creature of flesh and blood, a real man who lived in
the real world, and in 1649 he wrote a book about his trip to the moon. Since it's a firsthand
account, I don't see why anyone should doubt what he says" (38). This argument is
interesting on a few levels. First, Fogg as the narratorofMoonPalace is providing a first
handaccount, so in someways it is a plea forbelief. Secondly, the storyCyrano gives via
Fogg suggests that the Gardenof Eden is on themoon,directlycontradicting Fogg's own
insight into the Apollo moon landing. If we are to believe firsthand accounts as truth we
must believe simultaneously that the moon is both the Garden of Eden and the farthest man
has been from Paradise.
Interestinglyenoughboth accounts of themoonlandingcan be tied to the American
West; the former through manifest destiny andthe latterthrough Cyrano's claimthathis
successful voyage to the moon was the result ofa launching that took place "among a tribe of
naked Indians inNew France" (39). Moon Palace directly addresses the myth of the
American West through the influence and stories ofEffing. As Effing begins to tell Fogg the
story ofhis life, herealizes that Fogg has never seen aRobert Blakelock painting, sohe
sends Fogg to theBrooklyn Museum to see Blakelock's Moonlight. Fogg sees in the
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painting "an American idyll, theworld the Indians had inhabited beforethewhite mencame
to destroy it...I thought to myself, this picturewasmeant to stand for ever3^hing we had lost.
It was not a landscape, it was a memorial, a death song for a vanished world" (139). Fogg
sees this picture of the west as an idyll. It is not the actualworldNativeAmericans inhabited
prior to the Euro-American "settlement"of the land,but an idealizedvision of what that
scenemight have been like, particularly to an American conscience that might feel guilty for
Manifest Destiny. Auster, here, addresses the myth of a vanishing world. Such a world
could not have vanished since the idealized version of it, because of its idealized nature,
could never have existed.
Effing's journey out West is no less an American myth than the Blakelock painting.
Its culmination with a Wild West shootout is only one example of its mythic elements. After
presenting Effing's story Fogg addresses the "truth" of it:
After a while, I stopped wondering whether he was telling me the truth or not. His
narrative had taken on a phantasmagoric quality by then, and there were times when
he did not seem to be remembering the outward facts of his life so much as inventing
a parable to explain its inner meanings.. .It did not seem possible that anyone could
have made it up, and Effing told it so well, with such palpable sincerity, that I simply
let myself go along with it, refusing to question whether these things had happened or
not. (183)
Fogg may have been able to simply go along with it, but he doesn't let the reader of his
narrative do the same. By bringing up the truthfulness of Effing's testimony, even if he has
accepted it to be true, Fogg forces the reader to suspect its validity. Historiographic
metafiction requires the reader to question "centraUzed, totalized, hierarchized, closed
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systems" but at the same time recognizing "the human urge to make order, while pointing out
that the orders we create are just that: human constructs, not natural or given entities"
(Hutcheon 41-43). If this is the case, then certainly Moon Palace and Fogg's rendering of
Effing's story can be considered postmodern historiographic metafiction.
Shiloh suggests that fundamentally, at both personal and historical levels, Moon
Palace is a novel about guilt She argues that, "Effing's reaction to the death of his friend's
young son echoes Fogg's reaction to the death of his uncle. Both experience a terrifying
void; both attempt to 'vanish into another world,' Fogg seeks to literally vanish.. .Effing
decides to change his life and his identity" (125). Effing's story is the most obvious
embodiment of this guilt. Shiloh suggests that the guilt drives Effing, like Sachs in
Leviathan, to seek a "cruel and inexorable form of justice" (125). This is exactly what Effing
believes he receives after his accident and the loss of his legs.
The guilt Effing harbors reflects a larger American guilt; Shiloh notes that, "By going
west, the heroes ofMoonPalace re-enact in their individual histories the historyof the
nation, tacitly accepting the mythical value of the West in the American tradition. But their
experiences run counterto theirexpectations, shedding a different light on the ideology that
helpedshape their dreams" (130). The ideology that is reshapedis that of the American
West as a virgin land waiting for a second Adam. Shiloh claims that while this is not news to
such scholars as "HenryNashe Smith, Kolodny, Jehlen andBaym," it is to Effing. While he
does encounter "The vast expanses of wilderness" hemust alsorecognize that "the
consequences of his journey undermine the promise of freedom and self-fulfillment
associated with theWest. He loses the youngmanentrustedto his care and kills the outlaws
who attack himin thecave. His experiences in theUtah desert brand himwith guilt and
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mark the beginning of his downfall" (130). In this way both the reader and Effing see the
"sin and the guilt bred on his journey west as the reflection of America's sin and guilt" (131).
The story that Effing tells himself and the one he has heard from those who encouraged him
to go west, was the meta-narrative of the American West: a journey west was a journey to an
empty paradise. What Effing finds is paradise, but also sin, one that leads him to murder.
Carsten Springer's reading of Effing's westward journey, in Crises: The Works of
PaulAuster^ echoes Shiloh's. He suggests that it "can be read as an allegory on the
settlement of the American West and the pushing back of the frontier" (143). Effing,
Springer argues, is like America; he feels an irresistible urge to move west and once there
sees it as an opportunity to renew, and possibly to reinvent himself. Springer then discusses
the points of connection between Effmg and a Wild West hero. He sees that, 'The elements
of the rags-to-riches tale are as present as standard ingredients of the Western genre such as
the struggle of man against untamed nature and a shoot-out. Effing's narrative therefore
appears like an imitation, an intertextual game which renders any claim for factual 'truth'
obsolete" (143-4). Springer believes that Effing's narrative is consciously intertextual and as
a result of this consciousness he is able to exert some control. He further concludes, "As the
artistic creator of his own identity in a story,whicheven finds its addressee in Fogg, Effing
becomesAuster's first character to unify himself by means of his own 'metanarrative.'
Effing ignores the postmodernconditions of life" (144). Springeraccurately demonstrates
Effing's control overmetanarratives. His interpretation of this control, however, is flawed.
While Effing mayignore his postmodem condition—he often denies thepossibility of
coincidence—this does notmean that heisn't influenced by it. The notion that Effing is the
first to try and ignore the fragmentation ofpostmodernism bycreating a unifying
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metanaaative seems off the mark. In fact, creating one's own metanarrative seems to be a
recurring theme in Auster's fiction. One could even argue that Moon Palace is metanarrative
designed by Fogg to give meaning to his life. By doing so, according to Springer, Fogg
"ignores the postmodern conditions of life." He does, but it doesn't accomplish anything. It
only places him in a position to act in bad faith.
Fogg's Existential Errors
Varvogli also addresses the historicism in Moon Palace. He claims that '^ Moon Palace is
saturated with references to historical events" (124), in an effort to establish chronology. The
moon is then seen, as has been previously suggested, as the last frontier. Varvogli goes on to
argue that for Auster, no frontier can bring ultimate knowledge, "Although Moon Palace is a
quest narrative, there is not a fundamental truth waiting to be discovered by the
narrator/protagonist" (126). Finding a fundamental truth would deny the historiographic
metafictional, and for that matter, postmodern root Auster is careful to cultivate. Moreover,
finding a fundamental truth would suggest that a clear system of ethical guidelines can be
established. Varvogli argues that fundamental truth cannot be found in Moon Palace^ and
then he quickly contradicts himself. Later in his study he claims that, "Having filled in the
blanks of his family history, [Fogg] now takes full control of his own life, and embarks on
his final journey of discovery across the desert. It is here that he will finally reach adulthood
and make peace with himself (128). While Fogg has certainly filled in the blanks of his
history, it is difficult to say that he is now in control of his life in a way that he wasn't at the
beginning of the novel. In addition, the idea that he reaches a benchmark like adulthood to
achieve some inner peace, suggests a permanence that runs counter to the fragmentation of
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postmodernism, and the abandonment of existentialism. Varvogli, however, is consistent in
his assessment of a fully developed Fogg. He argues that, "The fundamental truth that Fogg
seeks is not a universal truth, the truth of historical fact. The only accessible truth, which is
the truth of art, is to be arrived at by finding one's own place in the world and its events"
(131). Auster is certainly concerned about the importance of finding one's place in the
world. But to suggest that finding one's place is a fundamental truth, although not universal
(a case of hair sphtting) is to suggest that one's place is permanent. This is an idea that
doesn't fit with the rest ofMoon Palace.
Fogg has not found his place in the world, but he tries to convince himself otherwise.
While Moon Palace does not fully develop Auster's ethical existentialism, it does present a
character who consistently lies to himself, and in this way, acts poorly, or in bad faith. As a
young man Fogg is presented with existential ideas by his uncle. When they first move in
together Victor gives an elaborate meaning to his nephew's full name. Marco Stanley Fogg
is the name that alludes to three explorers, both historical and fictional. Later, however,
Fogg decides to provide his own definition. As the narrator describes it, "When I was
fifteen, I began signing all my papers M. S. Fogg, pretentiously echoing the gods ofmodem
literature, but at the same time delighting in the fact that the initials stood for manuscript^
(7). Victor likes the idea and provides Fogg with an understanding that will last a lifetime,
"Uncle Victor heartily approved of this about-face. 'Every man is the author of his own life,'
he said. 'The book you are writing is not yet finished. Therefore, it's a manuscript. What
couldbe more appropriate than that?"' (7). At the age of fifteen Fogg gets his first lesson in
existentialism. Each individual is in charge of his or her choices, and while those choices
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may shape the appearance of the manuscript; the book is never finisheduntil the day one
dies.
Fogg demonstrates some of this thinking after he is saved from starvation and brought
to Zimmer's apartment to recover. There he begins to contemplate the selfish natureof his
starvation and pledges to be different. The pledge is long and complicated and deserves to be
quoted at length:
The days went by in Zimmer's apartment, and as I slowly put myself back together, I
realized that I would have to start my life all over again. I wanted to atone for my
errors, to make amends to the people who still cared about me. I was tired of myself,
tired ofmy thoughts, tired of brooding about my fate. More than anything else, I felt
a need to purify myself, to repent for all my excesses of self-involvement. From total
selfishness, I resolved to achieve a state of total selflessness. I would think of others
before I thought of myself, consciously striving to undo the damage I had done, and
in that way perhaps I would begin to accomplish something in the world. It was an
impossible program, of course, but I stuck to it with almost religious fanaticism. I
wanted to turn myself into a saint, a godless saint who would wander through the
world performing good works. No matter how absurd it sounds to me now, I believe
that was precisely what I wanted. I was desperate for a certainty, and I was prepared
to do anything to find it. (73-4)
Fogg's pledge sounds like it fits into both Catalano's and Anderson's rendering of Sartrean
ethics. For both ethicists, the chance or opportunity to choose against the decisions of one's
past is a clear indication of existential hope. Fogg recognizes that he need not be who he is.
He understands that he is defined by his past actions and looks to repair the damage those
47
actions have created, but he also knows that he can change. And at one point he even
recognizes the impossibility of his program for total change. The problem with his pledge as
seen through postmodern existential eyes is his hope that if he achieves his goals he will be
finished. He desires to become a "godless saint who would wander through the world
performing good works." Saints, the ones with a god, are saints for eternity; once this status
is achieved it is rarely lost. And in the end this is what Fogg desires; he "was desperate for a
certainty." The desperation for certainty can be seen as Fogg's postmodern and existential
flaw. While he recognizes the chance for change, he refuses to accept that the world is in a
constant state of flux. Once he changes for the better, he wants that change to be permanent.
Consequently, his actions can be regarded as actions done in bad faith.
This desire for certainty begins to exert itself in the way Fogg assigns meaning to the
events he experiences. After his and Effing's encounter with Orlando, the man with the
topless umbrella, Fogg describes the scene as having substantial meaning. He describes the
reasons for the unusual feeling the meeting gave him, it "was not so much its
lightheartedness, but the mysterious way in which it seemed to exert an influence on
subsequent events. It was almost as if our meeting with Orlando had been a premonition of
things to come, an augury of Effing's fate" (210). Over the next few pages the reader sees
Effing remain in the storm, "like some midget Lear" (212) using the ineffective umbrella as a
prop. When Effmg subsequently catches pneumonia and dies, the "premonition" and
"augury of Effing's fate" come true. These, however, are not the key words or phrases of the
passage, but they do forecast for Fogg a movement away from the acceptance of a
postmodern reality. He has almost reached a point similar to his sickness of the early
chapters. While it is easy enough to create stories out of past events to argue for a natural
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course of history, the postmodernist recognizes that this is only storytelling. There is no way
of assigning meaning to events as they happen, and yet Fogg is close, once again, to doing
this. Of course, in the passage quoted above, he does use the words "seeming" and "almost"
suggesting that, as of Effing's death, he still understands that this kind of meaning making is
the product of his own narrative.
Some critics have taken Fogg's understanding of the world and suggested that Auster
is pushing postmodern ideas into the background. Springer suggests that "Behind these
'coincidences' in Moon Palace, however, lies the concept of fate, which in turn goes the way
of inheritance" (151). In other words, according to Springer, the chance happenings in the
novel are, in reality, clues that Fogg uses to understand his family tree. Through an
impressive display of close reading Springer connects the elements of the fortune cookie,
"The sun is the past, the earth is the present, the moon is the future" (Springer 150 Auster
Moon Palace 97) to the three generations of Fogg's family. Effing is the sun and past.
Barberthe earth andpresent, andFoggis themoon andfuture (Springer 150-52). Springer
concludes from this reading that, "ambivalence and plurality, illustratingthe postmodern
livingconditions, are pushed into the background in favor of the 'metanarrative' of family
relations and inheritance. Thejourneyreaches its destiny; in contrast to manydeconstructive
postmodern texts.. .Moon Palace reaches its destination when answers are indeed found"
(152). Springer suggests that the form of Moon Palace remains consistent with Auster's
postmodern style, but that its themes and the development ofFogg suggest that the novel is
more concerned withdeveloping meta-narratives. While I believe Fogg moves in such a
direction, I do not think Auster advocates such amove; the novel suggests that Fogg's
movement is in error.
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After Effing's death, Fogg encounters the same message found in his fortune cookie,
in an essay written by Tesla, a man he was researching. He is astounded by the coincidence,
and understandably so. He then begins looking for meaning in it. He says, "The
synchronicity of these events seemed fraught with significance, but it was difficult for me to
grasp precisely how. It was as though I could hear my destiny calling out to me, but each
time I tried to listen to it, it turned out to be talking in a language I didn't understand" (233).
He then equates the quest for meaning to a "crackpot solution...strange conspiracies of
matter, precognitive signs, premonitions, a view of the world similar to Charlie Bacon's"
(234). Again, Auster demonstrates that searching for signs to one's destiny or fate is similar
to seeing the world through the eyes of the mentally ill. By doing so Fogg approaches the
Jamesonian schizophreniaencountered in the early chapters. The reality, as Fogg sees it, is a
world of fragmentation, a meaningless world, buthe is desperate to betraythis knowledge.
He wants to find absolutemeaning and significance in events as they happen.
The conflict within Foggculminates with his tripoutwest. Thismovement begins
with a conversation hehaswithBarber and Kitty. Barber asks the two if theythought
Effing's Wild West tale was true. Kitty responds in a truly postmodern fashion, "Kitty
leaned forward onherelbow, looked to herleftatme, looked to herright at Barber, and then
summed up thewhole complicated problem in two sentences. 'Of course hewas telling the
truth,' she said. 'Hisfacts might notalways have been correct, buthewas telling the truth'"
(276). This response mirrors Fogg's initial reaction to Effing's story. Fogg, however, has
moved away from what heknows tobereal, he has practiced lying tohimself enough that at
this point in the novel he is unable to respond.
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Kitty's abortion pushes Fogg beyond himself. The possibility of the event echoes his
understanding of his mother's heroism. He sees in her past actions a strength of character,
and he owes his life to that strength. Fogg describes his mother's past: "A less willful
woman would have given me up for adoption—or, even worse, have arranged to have an
abortion.. .if my mother hadn't been who she was, I might not have made it into the world. If
she had done the sensible thing, I would have been dead before I was ever bom, a three-
month-old fetus lying at the bottom of some garbage can in a back alley" (239). Fogg
presents a difficult image, but it is clearly one that has left an influence on him. This
influence allows the reader to understand Fogg's reaction to Kitty's pregnancy. As he sees it,
and describes it to the reader, "the baby had begun to exist the moment Kitty told me she was
carrying it insideher. Evenif it was no largerthan a thumb, it was a person, an inescapable
reality. If wewent ahead andarranged for an abortion, I felt it would be the samething as
committing murder" (279). Moon Palace doesn't argue against Kitty or Fogg, it does,
however, point to Fogg's actions and ask that he recognize theirmotivations. He doesn't fall
on the pro-life side of thedebate because it has any more natural validity than Kitty's
argument; hefeels the way hedoes because the narrative hehas created forhimself suggests
this feeling. Recognizing his self-created narrative and acting with this knowledge would
demonstrate existential good faith. Fogg, however, routinely acts inbadfaith. Nowhere in
his description oftheir arguments does this come up as his reason for wanting the child.
What isaddressed is his desire to be a father. Fogg describes his impatience, "The baby was
my chance to undo the loneliness ofmy childhood, to be part ofa family, to belong to
something thatwasmore thanjust myself, andbecause I hadnot beenaware of this desire
until then, itcame rushing out of me in huge, inarticulate bursts of desperation" (280),
51
Ultimately Fogg has little knowledge of himself and the narrative he as created. As a result,
he begins to see things as inevitable.
Fogg heads to the desert after the abortion because as he says, "so many things had
been smashed and destroyed, that my initial feelings no longer mattered. I went because I
had no choice. It wasn*t that I wanted to go; it was simply that circumstances had made it
impossible for me not to go" (278). At this point Fogg is fully involved in self-deception.
He believes he can no longer choose; he has given into his desire for certainty. Fogg agrees
with Barber to look for Effing's cave because he wanted a journey to lose himself in. He
describes his intentions, "We would search, but we would not find. Only the going itself
would matter, and in the end we would be left with noting but the futility of our own
ambitions. This was a metaphor I could live with, the leap into emptiness I had always
dreamed of (288). The abortion and subsequent separation from Kitty has placed Fogg in
the same mental place he was in after the death of his uncle. He wants to abandon himself in
the hopelessness of a cause because he hopes it will remove from him the need to choose. In
reality it only creates an illusion that he is no longer choosing. As the existentialists argue
again and again, no choice is choosing not to choose.
When Barber begins to make plans for their journey to the Utah desert, he suggests a
stop in Minnesota; among other things it would give Fogg a chance to see Effing's paintings.
This is something that Fogg had avoided doing earlier in the narrative. His reasons, as he
explains them are simple and postmodern, "After listening to Effing for so many months, I
had gradually begun to imagine his paintings for myself, and I realized now that I was
reluctant to let anything disturb the beautiful phantoms I had created.. .1 had dreamed them
for myself from his words, and as such they were perfect, infinite, more exact in their
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representation of the real than reality itself (232). For the postmodernist the world exists
through narrative, it is how it is described. Such a reaction to the world would carry over to
the details of the world including paintings. In this sense the paintings described by Effing
would differ from their referents. When Barber suggests a viewing, Fogg agrees. Again,
agreeing to see the paintings is not a wrong choice, but Fogg agrees simply because he
doesn't want to choose. He claims that, "In the spirit of the expedition we were about to
embark on, I said yes to everything" (288). Had he chosen to view the paintings to explore
the multiplicity of objects, or to look at the differences between signified and signifier, he
would have been behaving as a postmodernist, and what's more, he would have been acting
in good faith. Instead he deceives himself into believing that he no longer needs to choose.
After Barber's death, Fogg continues the trip to Utah and he continues to look for the
cave. He finds the man-made lake that drowned the cave andwhile exploringit in a boat has
his car stolen. Thatnight he sleeps by the sideof the roadandhe wakes up railing against
theuniverse, "By the time I woke up the nextmorning, shivering against the cold, it struck
methat thethefthadnot been committed bymen. It was a prank of thegods, an act of divine
malice whose only object was to crush me" (305). By this point Fogg has regressed beyond
hisearly self-imposed starvation. When hefinds ten dollars on the street asa homeless man,
he gives the event a supernatural significance, but he recognizes that he is assigning meaning
to the purely haphazard. In this final scene he feels as though a chance occurrence is
evidence of gods plotting againsthim.
From this point on Fogg walks to the ocean, and his happiness increases. He is
happier believing in asupernatural force, even ifit is malevolent, than he is in ameaningless
universe. When he reaches the end ofthe continent he pledges, again, "This is where I
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start.. .this is where my life begins" (306). If this is where his life begins, what is the reader
to make of the already written pages of his manuscript? Not only does such a statement
disregard all of his actions prior to reaching the ocean, it also suggests a permanence that is
unsustainable. Springer argues thatMoon Palace "reaches its destination" and that "answers
are indeed found." This simply doesn't fit with the novel. While Fogg makes claims to a
new start, the novel ends with him looking at the ocean. He has recently, although
inadvertently, brought about the death of his father, and lost his girlfriend and unborn baby.
His history with coping with loss is not great, and yet Springer argues that answers are found.
This doesn't hold. The argument becomes particularlyweak when one considers that
Auster^s next two novels involve characters crisscrossing Americain search for meaning.
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CHAPTER 3: LEVIATHANAND AARON'S SUCCESSFUL TELLING OF SACH'S
FAILURE
As I suggested in my previous chapter, Leviathan tells the story of Ben Sachs crossing
America in search of transcendent universal truth. It is also about Sachs's best friend, Peter
Aaron, and Aaron's attempt to tell Sachs's story. By telling both of these stories, Auster is
able to explore the existential bad faith of believing in absolute truths as well as possible
ways of living in good faith. Before I begin my examination of Leviathan^ I will briefly look
at Walter Oberman's reading of The Music ofChance. This novel is Auster's sixth major
work of fiction, published between Moon Palace and Leviathan. While the length restrictions
of this paper will not allow me to examine the ethical vision presented in the novel, a cursory
look at the ideas developed in TheMusic ofChance may help clarify the postmodem and
existential concerns present in the other two novels considered in my study.
Like Moon Palace, TheMusic ofChance develops characters who travel America.
Jim Nashe inherits a large sum of money and uses it to aimlessly drive. As his money begins
to run out, he meets Jack Pozzi, a professional gambler. Nashe decides to use the rest of his
inheritance to back Pozzi in a high-stakes poker game. After Pozzi loses the money, he and
Nashe find themselves indebted to the victors. Oberman's "Existentialism Meets
Postmodernism in Paul Auster's TheMusic of Chance" provides an excellent understanding
of Auster's sixth novel, in terms of both intellectual movements.
Oberman points to Auster's denial of absolutes; in particular, he argues that Auster
continually denies cosmic or divine justice: "there is no correspondencebetween a man's
moral character and what happens to him. In this respect [TheMusic ofChance] is merciless
in its denial of justice, as if justice were a natural right. The novel makes no concession to
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this and other assumptions predicatedon absolute values" (202). For Oberman, Auster is an
author dedicated to the destruction of the belief in universal truths. Oberman continues his
assessment of TheMusic ofChance by noting that Nashe, the novel's protagonist, refuses to
recognize what Auster believes to be absent. Moreover, Nashe's refusal presents itself as an
active attempt to reassert some universally held value. These attempts only reaffirm "the
existing power structure of society" (203). The lesson that Nash doesn't learn, but that is
presented to the reader is that "life is full of ethical choices that are not necessarily govemed
by absolute values and that all choices take place within a context. One must act and choose
from a position of ignorance, existential contingency, and moral uncertainty because one's
choices are neither self-justified, nor supported by external foundations" (203). Like Nashe,
Sachs—Leviathan's protagonist—refuses to leam this lesson. His denial of himself, and the
multiplicity and fragmentation of postmodemism places him on a path to destruction.
Oberman's most astute observation is his understanding that Auster portrays
characters that cannot live up to the existential demands of the postmodern world. He
focuses on Nashe's failure, but one can easily see that Auster routinely portrays characters
that fail. Fogg is desperate for a universal truth and therefore fails, and Sachs may be the
most extreme example of failure. The novels, however, also give the readers a reason for
hope. As I have already demonstrated, Fogg, while deceiving himself, is still alive at the end
of the novel. If he can somehow manage his grief, he might be able to act in good faith. Less
hope is present in The Music ofChance. Pozzi is gone and Nashe ends the novel by driving
himself, Murks, and Murks's son-in-law into another vehicle. But the novel ends
ambiguously with the crash, not the carnage afterwards. If the movie by the same name can
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be considered an interpretation ofAuster's vision (and the author's cameo in the final scene
suggests that it can), Nashe survives the crash and like Pozzi is picked up by a passing driver.
Oberman draws a connection between existentialism and postmodernism and
suggests by drawing this connection that Nashe acts in bad faith when he denies his
postmodern condition. But because he lives at the end of the story, there is hope for him. In
existential good faith, he has the option to choose against his previous choices. Sachs
doesn't have this choice. That said, Leviathan can be seen as a hopeful novel, as well; its
hope, however, does not rest in the protagonist. Sachs, like Auster's other principal
characters, rejects the existential demands of a postmodern world, but because of his literal
fragmentation, Auster leaves the reader with no hope that Sachs can be redeemed. The hope
in Leviathan, therefore, rests with the secondary character. Peter Aaron, unlike the minor
characters from the other novels of this period (Effing, Barber, and Pozzi), is a multi
dimensional character. More importantly, this full development allows Auster to use Aaron
as his model for living an existential ethic in a postmodern world.
In "FromMetonymy to Metaphor: Paul Auster's Leviathan,^ Linda L. Fleck argues
that the novel is composed as both a comedy and a tragedy. She notes that the division into
five chapters even follows the traditional five-act story arc. Aaron's story reads like a
comedy; after suffering, he finds true love. Sachs's story moves in the opposite direction.
Fleck notes that his "emergence from the dark woods ends in murder rather than marriage,
and his entire tale corresponds to the inverted U structure of tragedy" (209-10). Fleck goes
on to suggest that the novel is as much Aaron's as it is Sachs's, that it is a tragedy within a
comedy. This assessment doesn't seem to hold, as Aaron's story is primarily confined to the
second chapter. While I disagree with Fleck and see Aaron's story as secondary, I recognize
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its importance as commentary on Sachs's, and will divide the rest of this chapter accordingly.
The first section will deal with Sachs's failure to meet the existential demands of a
postmodern world. Aaron's ability to succeed where his friend fails will fill out the second
section.
Sachs's Failure
Almost every critical discussion of Leviathan points to Sachs's most obvious failure, his
literal fragmentation. Aaron sees it as his job to help the reader understand how Sachs
accidentally killed himself. Sachs andAaronmeet in 1975; in 1990Sachs blows himselfup.
According to Aaron, during the span of those fifteen years, "Sachs traveled from one end of
himself to the other" (15). One could read the two ends of Sachs's self as related to his
understanding of a postmodern condition and existential freedom. Aaron's narrative details
Sachs's gradualmovement away from a reluctant acceptance of postmodemityand
existential good faith. This journey ends with Sachs's death, and this ending is precededby
his desire for absolute and universal truth, a desire that leads to existential bad faith, or self-
deception. Leviathan's first chapter looks at Sachs's life prior to his friendship withAaron.
Thedecisions he makes at this earlypoint in his lifecome close to embracing a postmodern
and existential ethic.
The significant choices of Sachs's youth concern the timehe spentin jail for refusing
to be drafted and writing The New Colossus^ thenovel Sachs begins while in prison. Carsten
Springer's work onLeviathan in his book, Crises: The Works ofPaulAuster, points to The
NewColossus as Sachs's fist attempt to explore what he sees as the three elements of
freedom: liberty, self-determination, and disorientation. For Springer, two events shape
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Sachs's concept of freedom, namely his mother's vertigo (experienced initially in the Statue
of Liberty) and Sachs's own experience in prison as a protester of the Vietnam War (167-9).
Sachs's self-professed lesson learned after his first visit to the statue is that "freedom can be
dangerous. If you don't watch out, it can kill you" (39). The same event that granted Sachs a
freedom over his wardrobe, also profoundly frightened his mother. From Sachs's boyhood,
liberty and self-determination are coupled with disorientation.
Springer sees The New Colossus as a failure. He looks to Sachs's dependence on
Thoreau (both politically and artistically) as ineffectual, and questions Thoreau's relevance
for the 1960s, "The Thoreau model, and along with it the principal of self-determination, has
little in common with the facts of the twentieth century and provides the protagonist with no
valid answer to the freedom question (167-8). Springer then points to the difference between
Sachs and Thoreau, one of both duration and achievement. Sachs's time in jail, significantly
longer than Thoreau's one day, brings about little change. The error of Springer's analysis is
rooted in his assumption that both Thoreau and Sachs expect significant changes and
solutions to "the freedom question." Existentially, addressing the notion that freedom is
problematic is as far as one can go. There are no solutions. To use Springer's terms, freedom
provides one liberty and self-determination, but it also creates disorientation, or as Sartre
would call it, anguish, abandonment and despair. That Sachs can hold these three elements
of freedom together, and accept all three, argues for an existential success, not a failure.
As Aaron tells the reader, "political action for [Sachs] boiled down to a matter of
conscience. That is what made him decide to go to prison in 1968. It wasn't because he
thought he could accomplish anything there, but because he knew he wouldn't be able to live
with himself if he didn't go" (29). From what Aaron tells the reader, it seems reasonable to
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assume that Sachs is acting in good faith. He chooses to go to jail with little expectation
concerning the outcome of his choice, and realizes that he is solely responsible for that
choice. The New Colossus coupled with Sachs's decision to go to jail suggests that he
accepts the liberty, self-determination, and disorientation that come with freedom. In doing
so, Sachs is as close as he will ever come to demonstrating a postmodern and existential
ethic.
Unfortunately for Sachs, Springer is right; The New Colossus is a failure, just not for
the reasons Springer suggests. Sachs, in his decision to go to jail and in the vision for
America he presents in his first novel, is overly dogmatic. Aaron also sees the work as a
success, but he too misses the potential tunnel vision suggested by the novel. While Aaron
recognizes that the book has "definite flaws" (44), he also argues that it proposes a "very
sensitively handled" (41) vision for America. The vision is that "America has lost its way.
Thoreau was the one man who could read the compass for us, and now that he is gone, we
have no hope of finding ourselves again" (43). For Aaron, the content of Sachs's book is less
important than his ability to create a vision. Later, after Sachs's accident, Aaron comments
on the elation he feels when he hears that Sachs had started a new novel: "He had started
work on something new, he told me, and I took this as such a momentous event, such a turn
around from his previous state, that I suddenly allowed myself to stop worrying about him"
(153). The very fact that Sachswas creatingfiction suggested that Sachswas healthy. Sachs
is creating a vision, and by creating a vision he is participating in the multiplicity at the heart
of a postmodern understanding of the world. Aaron's optimism, unfortunately, doesn't hold,
and within The New Colossus, one can see a hint of the attitude that will come to dominate
Sachs in the future. WhileSachs argues thatAmerica has losther way, he also suggests that
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there is "no hope" of finding it again. Sachs does not simply propose a vision for America,
he suggest in absolute terms that America is lost.
A minor example from the first conversation between Sachs and Aaron might help
clarify this point. The two discuss their immediate pasts and Sachs suggests that despite their
various paths, they both came to the same place (literally, Nashe's Tavern in the middle of a
snow storm). Aaron agrees, and says, "That's one way of looking at it" (24). Sachs's
reaction is interesting. He responds, "It's the only way of looking at it" (24). I don't want to
make too much of this distinction because at one level, it can easily be argued that the only
thing revealed by the conversation is that strangers rely on cliche's when they first meet and
talk with one another. However, this conversation is an interesting parallel to the ways in
which the two characters handle larger issues. Early on, Sachs suggests a stubborn nature
that can't abide multiplicity. Aaron, on the other hand, is capable of seeing multiple
conclusions.
After the publication and initial critical success of TheNew Colossus Sachs began
work on a new novel, "but once he was a hundred pages into it, he tore up the manuscript and
bumed it. Inventing stories was a sham, he said, and just like that he decided to give up
fiction writing" (54). Presumably inventing stories is a sham because it does not address
reality, a decidedlyun-postmodem point of view. Even the way Sachswrites suggests a
denial of postmodernism: "Sachs never had any of [Aaron's] difficulties. Words and things
matched up for him, whereas for [Aaron] they are constantly breaking apart, flying in a
hundred different directions" (55). In postmodern terms, the signifiers and the signified
easilymatchup for Sachs. He believes that the wordson the page have a direct relationship
with reality.
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Sachs may be able to create this one to one relationship between the signifiers and
signified, or believe that he can, because he has a peculiar way of reading the world, as if it
was a book. Aaron notes that Sachs "was a great one for turning facts into metaphors" (26).
One example of this is the title Sachs created for himself, "America's first Hiroshima baby"
(25). For Sachs, the world has specific meaning. He was bom on the day of the Hiroshima
bombing, and for him, this amounts to more than coincidence—it becomes a metaphor for his
life, it takes on meaning. In PaulAuster and Postmodern Quest, Dana Shiloh argues that,
"By treating reality as if it were fiction, Sachs seeks to endow it with significance and
purpose. Extremely knowledgeable, he is familiar with a host of facts and details, among
which he establishes the most preposterous connections" (108-9). Whether or not the
connections are preposterous, Sachs sees connections; he sees meaning inherent in the facts
of the world. This is a fundamental postmodern error, and by believing that-such meaningful
connections exist, Sachs is perpetuating his self-deception.
As Aaron progresses with the story of Sachs there are hints that Sachs is wiUing to
accept the fragmentation of the world. When he is living with Lillian there are moments
when he is struck by an inability to pinpoint reality. After two weeks of depositing money
into Lillian's freezer, Sachs is puzzled by the fact that she hadn't withdrawn any of it. Sachs
couldn't assign meaning to these facts:
[He] had no idea what to make of this detachment, this strange disregard for what he
had given her. Did it mean that she wanted no part of it, that she was refusing to
accept his terms? Or was she telling him that the money was unimportant, that it had
nothing to do with her decision to allow him to live in her house? Both
interpretations made sense, and therefore they canceled each other out, leaving him
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with no way to understand what was happening in Lillian's mind, no way to decipher
the facts that confronted him. (228)
Instead of accepting that there are two interpretations of the facts, Sachs is deeply bothered
by his inability to "decipher" them. Then, after Lillian opens up to him, he becomes
convinced that, "nothing was meaningless, that everything in the world was connected to
everything else" (231). Sachs is not comfortable until he can come to such sweeping
conclusions.
On the few occasions Sachs allows for multiple meanings, he seems to do so in a
pacifying and patronizing way. When he confronts Aaron about the affair between Aaron
and Fanny, he allows for multiple responses. Aaron is hurt and mocks Sachs's seeming
passivity, "I hadn't realized there were so many options available to us" (103). In a near
reversal of their first conversation, Sachs responds, "Of course there are. More than we can
count" (104). While Sachs's ability to accept multiple meanings for the affair provides'hope
for a postmodern recovery, more than likely, he claims to be open to multiplicity because he
is telling Aaron what Aaron wants to hear.
Sachs is increasingly obsessed with absolute and universal truth. While signs of this
concern are present early in the novel, it doesn't reach harmful dimensions until after he falls
from the fire escape. He initially believes that he went to the fire escape to get Maria to touch
him. After Aaron and Fanny's affair, Sachs made an effort to repair his marriage, and in
doing so, he vowed to avoid situations that could be construed as unfaithful. At the Fourth of
July party he was surprised by his desire for Maria, but he refused to touch her, so he devised
a way for her to touch him. As he tells Aaron, "I stuck to the letter of the law like a good
little Boy Scout, but I utterly betrayed its spirit.. .In my opinion, a man who goes to such
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lengths of self-deception deserves whatever he gets" (128-9). Looking back on the events,
Sachs realizes his own self-deception, and yet at the same times continues to deceive himself.
Falling from the fire escape was something Sachs believed he deserved. He sees the specific
lie he told himself concerning fidelity, but misses the existential bad faith of believing in
divine or cosmic punishment.
liana Shiloh's Paul Auster and Postmodern Quest connects this punishment to Moon
Palace. She notes that Sachs refuses to see the fall as bad luck and instead sees it as
punishment, and that Aaron "discerns in Sachs's account the same motif that Fogg had
discovered in Kepler's Blood: a subterranean cycle of guilt and desire, guilt turning into a
desire to expiate itself through a cruel and inexorable form of justice. This pattern
determines Sachs's entire course of actions subsequent to his fall" (110). Shiloh continues
her analysis by arguing that everything that happens to Sachs happens as a result of chance or
accident, and yet, "every course of action on which Sachs decides results from his belief in
cosmic justice" (110). Sachs's readiness to turn the facts of the world into metaphor
translates into his increasinglydestructive tendency to turnexistentialcontingency into
predetermined necessity.
This self-deception, even after Sachs has identified it, continues until the end of his
life, and is rooted in his desire to start his life over and deny the choices of his past.
Returning home afterhis accident, Sachs realizes thathe canno longerlivewithFanny. He
does not want to hurt her, however, so to avoid doing this he begins to convince her that she
should leave him. Aaron assesses thesituation positively forhis friend, "Hewas ruining her
life, he said, and before hedragged herdown with him into hopeless misery, she should cut
her losses and run. I don't think there's any question that Sachsbelieved this. Whetheron
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purpose or not, he had manufactured a situation in which these words could be spoken in
good faith" (146). Aaron's assessment is wrong; Sachs's ability to do this speaks to his bad
faith. In order to lie to Fanny, Sachs first needed to lie so thoroughly to himself that he
believed it. What is more, this excessive lying is done so that Sachs can start a new life for
himself; as Aaron points out, "Within a month of coming home from the hospital, I think he
was already looking for a way to break free of his marriage. It was a unilateral decision, a
product of his need to wipe the slate clean and start over again" (146). His reaction to the fall
stands as example of what Sartre would call bad faith.
In "Existentialism is a Humanism," Sartre covers the basic tenets of existentialism
and defends it from its critics. As I noted in the first chapter of my study, Sartre believes an
individual "is nothing else but that which he makes of himself (349). Sartre wants to stress
that humans do not have an inherent nature. An individual is freed from rules set forth by
God or universal concepts of humanity. His or her essence is not established until after he or
she exists. While existence does precede essence, it does not eliminate one's past or
memories. Once an individual has acted, he or she begins to define his or her self. Sartre
clarifies this point by arguing, "What we mean to say is that a man is no other than a series of
undertakings, that he is the sum, the organization, the set of relations that constitute these
undertakings" (359). Sachs's desire for a clean slate is a desire to wipe out his past
existence. As Sartre understands this, it is an impossible proposition; Sachs cannot remove
his past choices, he can only hope to make different choices in the future. Choosing
differently is certainly an existential choice. It is even the great hope of existentialism. But
one can't avoid responsibility for the decisions he or she has made. This is what Sachs has
done, and his desire to do so is an act of self-deception, an act of bad faith.
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As if he was trying to prove Sartre's points, Sachs continues liis self-deception in
California. After literally losing himself in the woods of Vermont, seeing a man shot to
death, and then killing the murderer with a baseball bat, Sachs looks for and finds a meaning
in the events. As Fleck points out, "Dimaggio shoots Dwight, end of discussion. There
neither is nor can be an explanationor justificationfor this act. It just is. It is pointless,
indeedimpossibleto ask why" (212). And yet, Sachsdoes exactly that. He must knowwhy.
Maria's connection to Reed provides him an answer:
Once Maria had told him about Dimaggio and Lillian Stem, he understood that the
nightmare coincidencewas in fact a solution, an opportunity in the shape of a miracle.
The essential thing was to accept the uncanninessof the event—not to deny it, but to
embrace it, to breathe it into himself as a sustaining force. Where all had been dark
for him, he now saw a beautiful, awesome clarity. Hewould go to Californiaand give
Lillian Stem the money he had found in Dimaggio's car. (187)
In and of itself, this decision is neitherwrongnor representative of bad faith. In fact, Sachs's
desire to give themoney he found inDimaggio's car to a stranger is not onlyunderstandable,
butadmirable. ForSachs, however, this is nota choice, buta matter of doing thenecessary
thing. In response to Lillian's hesitant reply, Sachs tells her, "It's that simple. I didn't
choose you. Circumstances gave you tome, and now I've got tomake good onmyend of
thebargain" (198). He seeshis actions as beingmandated by a cosmic justice,andon the
cosmic scale he has no choice. It is at this point that Sachs's bad faith exerts itself.
WhatAuster makes clear through Aaron's narration is thatSachs is not the product of
some cosmic manipulation, norhashebeen able to wipe his slate clean. Sachs is a product
of thedecisions hehasmade. Hisrefusal to leam from his self-deception creates more self-
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deception. While staying with Lillian he tries to create a situation almost identical to the one
that sent him falling off of the fire escape. Lillian told Sachs that she was a masseuse, and
Sachs devises a way to get her to touch him. He planned to stop by her work, "If she
happened to be free at that moment, he would ask for a massage. That would give him a
legitimate excuse to be touched by her again, and even as he savored the feel of her hands
along his skin, he could still his conscience with the thought that he was helping her to earn
her living" (234). Sachs is so fully capable of deceiving himself that he can use this
argument and at the same time plan to give Lillian over a hundred thousand dollars. While
this self-deception does not push him off a fire escape, or blow him into several pieces, it
does place him in great danger.
Sachs honestly believes that, "He could still his conscience with the thought that he
was helping her to earn her living." What is remarkable about this lie is that the money he
would use to pay for the massage is essentially Lillian's money anyway. From the moment
Maria makes the horrible connection, Sachs planned to give Lillian all of the money he
found. This act of self-deception tied up with money and lust is only an immediate and
superficial lie. More disconcerting is the fundamental self-deception Sachs must subject
himself to in order to believe that his actions are mandated by a universal law. Lillian is
understandably skeptical concerning Sachs's plan and she wants to know why he is giving
her the money. He tells her, "I didn't choose you. Circumstances gave you to me, and now
I've got to make good on my end of the bargain" (198). Sachs has convinced himself that he
doesn't have a choice, and yet he is constantly choosing. Shortly after this conversation he
goes out to his car and gets five thousand dollars. Lillian wonders why he doesn't give her
the whole sum and Sachs says, "That was the original plan, but things changedafter I got
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here. We're on to Plan B now" (201). While talking with Maria he believes that giving the
money to Lillian is required of him, and yet he doesn't just wire her the money or send her a
check. When he meets Lillian, he decides to follow plan B, and yet he still believes that he
has no choice in the matter, that he is simply following some universal code.
After his relationship with Lillian fails, Sachs's tries to wipe the slate clean again by
becoming the Phantom of Liberty. Even in this role of violence, Sachs perpetuates his self-
deception. Linda Felck's "Metonymy and Metaphor" argues that Sachs "blow[s] up
shrunken replicas, mere simulacra of the Statue of Liberty. In addition, his attempt to engage
in old-fashion political action would appear to fall victim to late capitalism's seemingly
infinite power of co-optation.. .In Sachs's case, the reappropriation takes the form of t-shirts
and buttons" (214). His attempts to criticize capitalism turn into elements of profit. As
pointed out earlier, Oberman sees this motif in much of Auster's work. Any attack on "the
existing power structure of society" only strengthens that structure. Like Nashe, Sachs
doesn't see this. He is aware of those capitalizing on the Phantom, but he sees that as an
opportunity, "He was making a mark, he said, a much greater mark that he had ever thought
possible" (263).
What's more, Sachs's reasons for becoming the Phantom sound similar to his reasons
for giving Dimaggio's money to Lillian. He tells Aaron, "All of a sudden, my life seemed to
make sense to me. Not just the past few months, but my whole life, all the way back to the
beginning. It was a miraculous confluence, a startling conjunction of motives and ambitions.
I had found the unifying principle, and this one idea would bring all the broken pieces of
myself together" (256). Sachs sees the contingency of his life as having inherent meaning.
He responds to this meaning with "one idea" to make him whole. Of course, as the reader
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knows and as Aaron knows writing the piece, "this one idea" physically separated "all the
brokenpieces." By the end of his life, Sachs is fully denyingexistential contingency and
looking for ways to reject postmodern fragmentation.
Aaron's Success
Leviathan is Auster's seventh novel, and as of this novel, Aaron is Auster's most articulate
view for a postmodern and existential ethic. As I have demonstrated, Sachs fails to live up to
an existential ethic in a postmodern world. He fails because he cannot quit his desire for
absolute truth, a truth impossible to find in Auster's fiction. Aaron succeeds, at times, in
embracing an existential ethic and living in good faith. He does so because he allows for
multiple truths. He accepts his postmodern condition. This acceptance is best demonstrated
in Aaron's ability to construct Sachs's story in a way that can be seen as historiographic
metafiction. Before I examine Aaron's connection to Hutcheon, it might be helpful to look at
where other critics have touched on this idea without explicitly addressing it in Hutcheon's
terms.
In "(The) Playing Author," Karin Esders argues that as Aaron reconstructs Sachs's
story, he also constructs his own autobiography. As a result, binary distinctions "between
reality and fantasy, truth and deception, self and other" (76) begin to fade. Esders's idea
coincides with Fleck's argument that Aaron's Leviathan exists because Sachs's doesn't.
Fleck goes on to suggest that there are two types of chance in the novel, "When the 'it
happened this way' is transformed into the 'it had to happen this way,' when the contingent
is turned into the necessary, we have moved from the world of metonymy to that of
metaphor" (209). Fleck's ideas are interesting, but using Jameson, she casts "the metonymic
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postmodern age" in a starkly negative light. She sees in the postmodern era, "A refusal (or
mere 'why bother') to ask why, to search for a reason for things" (212). This refusal is "an
acceptance of the radically contingent and the formula for action that flows from it: Just do
it—for no reason, just because" (212). Fleck's essay allows us to see Sachs and Aaron in
terms of metaphor and metonymy. I hope to show, however, that Aaron's acceptance of the
"radically contingent" doesn't lead to apathy and inertia, but instead allows him to embody
Auster's existential and postmodern ethic.
While Sachs is the author of TheNew Colossus, (a novel that can easily be described
as historiographic metafiction), he quickly abandons these ideas. It is Aaron that uses the
motifs of postmodern fiction to create the biography of his friend. As I explainedin the first
chapter of this study, Hutcheon defines postmodern fiction, or historiographicmetafiction as,
"a problematizing force in our culture today: it raises questions about.. .the common-sensical
and the ^natural.' But it never offers answers that are anything but provisional and
contextually determined" (xi). Aaron embraces this idea. He is sure to mention both the
contextof the story and that it is his account, or narrative, allowing for other possible
narratives.
On the surface of his narrative, it may not seemlike Aaron is as willing to embrace
theprovisional andcontextually determined. Before beginning thestory of his friendship
with Sachs, Aaron states:
One thing leads to another, and whether I like it ornot, I'm as much a part ofwhat
happened as anyone else. If not for thebreakup of mymarriage toDeliaBond, I
never would have met Maria Turner, and if I hadn't met Maria Turner, I never would
haveknown aboutLillianStem, and if I hadn't known aboutLillian Stem, I wouldn't
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be sitting here writing this book. Each one of us is connected to Sachs's death in
some way, and it won't be possible for me to tell his story without telling each of our
stories at the same time. Everything is connected to everything else, every story
overlaps with every other story. (57)
It seems as though Aaron is arguing for something greater than contingency. It's as though
he is suggesting that Maria's choice to pick up the lost black book—through a series of
highly improbable events—determines Sachs's choice to blow up replica statues. In
"Phantoms of Liberty," Mark Osteen discusses Aaron's statement of interconnection.
Understanding this discussion requires a brief summary of his Hobbesian reading of the
novel. Osteen argues that Sachs is the multiple "Artificial Man" Hobbes envisions in his
Leviathan. Accordingly, Sachs's multiple selves are forged together through the secrets he
shares with various characters. His secrets parallel the various ways individuals come
togetherand form the "ArtificialMan" of societal government. Aaron's purpose, in light of
Osteen's reading that placesSachs as the leviathan, is to put the pieces of Sachsback
together. As a result he comes to the conclusion that everything is connected to everything
else.
I think this is a fascinating reading ofAuster's Leviathan, and provides an interesting
insight into the title. That said, Osteen's reading ofAaron, and inparticular Aaron's claim
that everythingis connected is short-sighted. Osteennotes thatAaron claims that
"Everything is connected to everything else" but he doesn't mention the second part of
Aaron's sentence, "every story overlaps with every other story." The second part of the
sentence shows that Aaron is thinking along the lines ofhistoriographic metafiction. Aaron
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sees a connection, but not because a connection naturally exists or is inevitable. He sees a
connection through the act of telling a story.
Aaron addresses the significance of creating narratives as he begins to tell the story of
his ^fair with Fanny. He believes that this affair saved him from returning to his first wife,
Delia. He can only make this assessment by narrating the events of his past. As Aaron
confesses, "Fanny was the one who saved me from what would have been a terrible decision.
I can say that now in the light of what happened later, but back then nothing was clear to me"
(87). What Aaron later realizes is that the meaning he assigns to his affair is provisional, and
by nomeans necessary, and that the meaning he is capable of assigning to it can only happen
in light of historical perspective.
From the beginning of the novel, Aaron insists that his rendering of Sachs's story is
one of many possible versions. Aaron endeavors to speak the truth about Sachs's life to the
best of his abilities. He, however, recognizes the possibility for other truths. The reason
such a possibility exists is because, as Aaron claims early in the narrative, he is rushed. He
tells the reader, "I'm forced to work quickly, I have nothing to rely on but my own memories.
I'm not saying that these memories shouldbe doubted, that there is anything false or tainted
about the things I do know about Sachs,but I don't want to present this book as something
it's not. There is nothing definitive about it" (25). Even if Aaron had the time to do
interviews andresearch documents, his story could never be definitive. No storycan acquire
such status because of the fragmentation of the postmodernworld. Aaron understands this
logic.
Shortly after setting his terms, Aaron demonstrates where multiple truths can exist.
In relating the events of his first marriage, he addresses the reasons for his divorce: "She
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must have understood that I would notice [her diary]. Assuming that was true, it was almost
as if she were inviting me to read what she had written. In all events, that was the excuse I
gave myself that night, and even now Vm not so sure I was wrong. It would have been just
like her to act indirectly" (61). Either Delia left the journal for Aaron to read, or it was an
accident. Aaron has no way of knowing for sure, and he lets the reader see both possibilities,
and suggests that there could be others that he doesn't see. Aaron uses a similar technique in
detailing the first marriage of Lillian Stem. He knows that she becomes a prostitute, but he
doesn't know how this line of work started; he doesn't know the reasons. Consequently, he
gives the reader as many reasons as he can.
Not everyone sees Aaron's constant awareness of multiple stories as admirable, or a
success for Auster. In ''Leviathan-. Post Hoc Harmonies," Arthur Saltzman argues that
''Leviathan is riddled with Aaron's disclaimers and misgivings, so much so that the story of
Sachs quickly evolves into a book long delineation of the inevitability of storification. For
every insight there is an apology" (164). I suppose if the ultimate purpose of Leviathan is to
tell the one and only story of Sachs, then Aaron's asides might seem obtrusive. They get in
the way of coming to a singular understanding of Sachs. These asides, however, are crucial
to a telling of Sachs in light of historiographic metafiction.
In The World that is the Book, Aliki Varvogli also addresses "Aaron's disclaimers
and misgivings," but argues that Leviathan "is a novel in which the categories 'fiction' and
'reality' collapse into one another as the world and the book become indistinguishable"
(142). He then argues "Above all, what emerges from his narrative is the realization that
writing about someone else's life is a process of fiction making" (154). In other words, it is
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impossible to detail the events of someone*s"real" life without resorting to narrative. This is
a concept at the heart of historiographic metafiction and one embraced by Aaron.
As I mentioned earlier the possibility of multiple meanings and readings of any given
situation begins in earnest with Aaron and Fanny's affair. Aaron learns that any meaning can
only be had in the light of narrative. With this understandingcomes the loss of certainty.
When Fanny comes on to him, Aaron is thrown: "now that she had turned my secret into a
blunt and vulgar proposition, I scarcely knew who she was anymore. Fanny had become
someone else. Ben had become someone else. In the space of one brief conversation, all my
certainties about the world had collapsed" (94). When he tries to pinpoint Fanny's
motivations, he is lost. He finally concludes that she knew it was going to be a temporary
affair, but then he feels that he should reject this meaning: "The only problemis that it
contradicts everything she said and did during the three weeks we spent together. What
looks like a clarifying thought is finally nomore than anothersnag. The momentyou accept
it, the conundrum startsall overagain" (98). It's interesting to compare this reaction to
Sachs's when he can't figure out Lillian's motivation. While Sachs is uncomfortable until he
candecipher Lillian's actions, Aaron accepts themultiplicity and eventually goes with a
reading that sees Fanny's actions as selfless. But, as he tells the reader, "Of all the
interpretations I've consideredover the years, this is the one I like the best. That doesn't
mean it's true, but as long as it couldbe true, it pleases me to thinkit is" (99), His reaction
makes sense; as Aaron's marriage was failing he looked toSachs and Fanny's as perfection.
It is plausible that he should beconfused byFanny's proposition. His choice toembrace
ambiguity is also understandable.
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This attitude continues into his confrontation with Sachs about the affair. After their
conversation, Aaron is confused. He feels as though he doesn't know the people he loves:
"After that lunch I no longer knew what to believe. Fanny had told me one thing, Sachs had
told me another, and as soon as I accepted one story, I would have to reject the other" (109).
The two stories about Sachs's fidelity are equally convincing and Aaron believes them both.
He believes them both because while each story contradicts the other, they're both true.
Aaron is certain that "Fanny and Ben had been telling [him] the truth. The truth as they saw
it, perhaps, but nevertheless the truth" (109).
Some read the openness to multiple truths as a flaw of Aaron's. In "Multiple
Personality Disorder, Literature, and the Politics of Memory," Robert Scott Stewart and Paul
Dumouchel argue that, "unable to decide what is the Truth, Aaron comes up with an
explanation on his own" (115). The two writers are frustrated with Aaron for what they see
as laziness; they believe he creates a fictitious explanation because he didn't want to work to
find the truth. Directly contradicting Aaron's assessment that both Fanny and Sachs were
telling him the truth about their marriage, Stewart and Dumouchel argue that, "No matter
what may be the explanation for their actions it most probably is not what they pretend"
(116). To back this reading, the critics argue that Sachs is obviously holding back, and not
telling the truth. Later, they go so far as to suggest that Aaron is in bad faith, when he reads
Fanny's actions as selfless. Stewart and Dumouchel claim that the reason Aaron accepts
Sachs's explanation of his marriage is because it relieves both Sachs and Aaron of their guilt
and turns Fanny into a saint. They believe that Aaron is in bad faith because believing Fanny
was selfless "constitute[s] a refusal to face the indeterminacy of what happened.. .What
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Aaron does not want to accept is that Fanny's actions are to some extent indeterminate"
(119).
I don*t see how Stewart and Dumochel can come to this conclusion. Aaron does
choose to believe that Fanny's actions were selfless, but he doesn't choose this because he
believes that he has ferreted out some indisputable truth. He fully accepts that he may never
know why Fanny acted the way she did. What's more, to chastise a character for not being
able to determine a truth and then turn around and condemn that same character for not
allowing for indeterminacy seems to ask for the impossible.
Esders comes closer to assessing Aaron's understanding on the grounds Aaron
provides the reader. She suggest that Aaron is in a tough position: "There is no single
identifiable source of truth; rather, there are contradictory, multiple versions which are
dependent on personal perspectives and cultural conventions; truths which oftentimes are
mutually exclusive and leave the narrator and reader in a state of confusion and distraction"
(81). It is the state of confusion that Aaron embraces, and that Auster sees as part of a
postmodern and existential ethic. The world of Auster's novels is a fragmented and multiple
place. As a result there can be no foundation for choosing, and yet choose one must. Aaron
recognizes this and acts accordingly.
Maybe the best example of Aaron's success and Sachs's failure can be found in their
reaction to Maria's knowledge of Dimaggio. As I mentioned earher, Sachs refuses to see this
as coincidence or improbable chance. Instead, he sees it as a message from the universe for
cosmic justice. He denies the postmodemity of Auster's world and in doing so deceives
himself. Aaron on the other hand is consistently trying to act in good faith. While he is not
completely successful (no one is), he tries. He tells the reader that the connection between
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Maria and Reed shocked him, "that is because the real is always ahead of what we can
imagine. No matter how wild we think our inventions might be, they can never match the
unpredictability of what the real world continually spews forth. This lesson seems
inescapable to me now. Anything can happen. And one way or another, it always does"
(180). Aaron wants to reject this idea, and like Sachs live in a world where there is cosmic
justice. But he can't. He recognizes the existential contingency of the world and does his
best to act within it.
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Postmodern and existential ethic developed in Moon Palace and Leviathan is anecdotal.
Taking into consideration postmodemism's fragmentation and existentialism's abandonment,
it seems impossible for any ethic to be anything but situational. Consequently, Auster's
ethics are displayed through the telling of stories. What can we derive from the stories of
ethical choices Auster presents the reader? Or to phrase the question using Booth's
terminology, how does Auster "offer a distinctive and engaging way of being together?"
More often than not, Auster's characters fail, and yet his vision for acting in a
postmodern world is clear. The author accepts the fragmentation and uncertainty of the
world even if his characters do not. In Moon Palace^ Auster paints the world in terms of
Hutcheon's historiographic metafiction. He questions large national myths such as Manifest
Destiny and the moon landing. In addition to this he demonstrates how historiographic
metafiction can be applied to personal histories. Fogg never fully takes on Auster's vision.
He is desperate for certainty and consequently doesn't see his own complicity in the creation
of his historical narrative. This leads to the destruction of his relationships and existential
bad faith. By the end of the novel he has deceived himself into believing that he no longer
needed to choose. Through Fogg, Auster is showing the reader the flaws of denying
postmodernism.
Auster takes a similar approach in his depiction of Ben Sachs. Auster again presents
a postmodern world and a character eager to deny the fragmentation and uncertainty of life.
Sachs, like Fogg, acts in bad faith. He deceives himself in his attempts to get both Maria and
Lillian to touch him. More importantly he deceives himself into believing that he has found
some unifying principal, some way to remain whole in a fragmented world.
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Unlike Moon Palace, however, Leviathan isn't just a compilation of ways not to act.
For the first time in Auster's fiction he presents a fully developed character who tries to act
in good faith. While not always successful, Aaron's acceptance of postmodern fragmentation
and multiplicity is Auster's best example of how to act in the world. Aaron recognizes the
possibility for multiple truths, most noticeably in his acceptance of both Ben's and Fanny's
explanation of their marital fidelity. More importantly he acts knowing that nothing can be
done to guarantee the morality of his choice. By doing so, Aaron becomes the embodiment
of Auster's postmodern and existential ethics.
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